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Abstract
BLOCKCHAIN ELECTIONS: SMART CONTRACT ELECTORAL SYSTEM
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Nathaniel Patrick Hernandez
B.S., Appalachian State University
M.S., Appalachian State University
Chairperson: Cindy Norris, Ph.D.
Proponents of Internet-based voting systems suggest that it might offer solutions to
alleviate some of the shortcomings previous democratic institutions have fallen vic-
tim to: gerrymandering, election fraud, malicious ballot-box zoning, etc. This has
become especially relevant as governments and societies wrestle with the COVID-19
pandemic, state-sponsored election interference, and claims of election fraud. How-
ever, Internet voting systems are fraught with risks and there is a wealth of research
and real-world incidents which demonstrate the plethora of issues one would face
in implementing such a system. Voting systems are well-understood to have noto-
riously difficult to fulfill requirements, which are often at odds with one another,
including security, privacy, and verifiability requirements. The rise in popularity of
blockchain-based technologies has renewed interest in such systems, and although
it is unlikely that publicly available blockchain-based solutions can meet the re-
quirements demanded of large-scale elections, there is potential utility in having
iv
on-chain electoral systems available for lower-stakes decision-making. This research
investigates blockchain-based decision-making through electoral system design and
implementation using the Ethereum blockchain and Solidity programming language.
This research demonstrates that secure and verifiable small-scale voting systems can
be built using “off-the-shelf” blockchain technologies when privacy constraints are
loosened. This research further demonstrates that the costs associated with operat-
ing such voting systems are steep, likely rendering such systems impractical in most
circumstances and therefore an inappropriate foundation for large-scale elections. Fi-
nally, this research identifies which electoral systems and features are viable within
these blockchain environments and the associated costs of supporting and operating
these electoral systems and features.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction
This research investigates blockchain-based decision-making through electoral system
design and implementation. Decision-making, in its idealized form, is a process which
entails the evaluation of some problem’s context and environment in order to identify
relevant criteria and variables worth considering. An analysis of these criteria and
variables can be used to identify a problem’s decision-space: the individual impact
of each variable, their trade-offs, and ultimately a set of viable choices to pick from.
Weights might be applied to the criteria — determined by the choice-maker’s personal
values, beliefs, and preferences — which, when considered with each of the viable
choices’ risks and rewards, could be used to produce a final choice with an optimal
outcome. This decision-making process is a non-trivial procedure which becomes
increasingly difficult to consider as the consequences of the decisions become more
significant; and the analysis process harder to evaluate as the variables, factors, goals,
and the general environment of the problem becomes more complex. For example,
it is much more difficult to make decisions that have long-lasting impacts than when
the impacts are strictly immediate; likewise, decision-making which involves complex
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ethical concerns, e.g., life or death, are much more difficult to consider than those
which do not.
Decision-making in reality rarely lives up to the standards required to meet
that of the idealized process; full-knowledge of an environment is rare and constraint
satisfaction is often sufficient, i.e., most decisions require only a “good enough” so-
lution. Heuristics are often used to trade optimality, completeness, accuracy, or
precision for speed. Tacit knowledge or intuition is used to fill the gaps in one’s ex-
plicit knowledge or substituted for reliable information. And even thorough decision-
making processes can still produce poor results: over-analysis can cause “analysis
paralysis,” preventing one from arriving at any decision at all; too much information
can cause information overload, preventing one from properly assimilating knowl-
edge, or worse, producing an illusion of knowledge; and still, unconscious biases,
instincts, and emotions and can subvert well-intended decision-making processes.
All of the complexities regarding decision-making become more complex at
scale as we attempt to manage group-based decision-making processes: the processes
themselves become fractured as they are distributed across individuals, personal bi-
ases manifest themselves as group biases, and the various procedures and algorithms
used to collect, accumulate, and evaluate individuals’ preferences are themselves
flawed and biased in their own ways. [39] Democratic communities aim to make de-
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cisions by granting and counting individuals’ votes; and although voting may seem
conceptually simple, there are practical and theoretical complexities which are dif-
ficult to overcome. The complexities with respect to actually implementing such
systems often result in systems which are mired with imbalances, fraud, and cor-
ruption. The disenfranchisement of citizens is one example of this and it occurs in
many ways: lobbying, vote buying, gerrymandering, malicious ballot-box zoning, and
overly aggressive voter identification requirements to name a few. Many other forms
of voter suppression and election fraud exist which provide real-world examples of
the shortcomings a democratic-process might incur and demonstrate the complexity
of designing such decision-making systems. [26,39,12]
Issues such as these in conjunction with the growing usage and near-ubiquitous
nature of the Internet and personal computers has led many to consider whether the
Internet could offer a new medium through which votes could be cast. Proponents of
Internet-based voting systems suggest that it might offer solutions to alleviate some
of the shortcomings previous democratic institutions have fallen victim to. This has
become especially relevant as governments and societies wrestle with the COVID-19
pandemic and state-sponsored election interference. However, online voting has been
shown to be fraught with risks, and there has been a wealth of research and events
which demonstrate the plethora of issues one would face in implementing such a
3
system. [30,50]
The research with respect to large-scale Internet-based voting systems is clear:
the potential rewards of such systems do not currently outweigh the risks. [29] This
research does not intend to retread this ground, nor does it set out to advocate
for such a system. However, digital organizations and communities which exist and
operate entirely “on-chain” are everyday springing into existence; this has become
especially true since the advent of blockchain technologies such as Ethereum, which
provides decentralized foundations for securely executing arbitrary code. [17,15] Like
all organizations these decentralized organizations and communities need decision-
making processes and systems to reach group consensus. To that end, this research
explores blockchain-based electoral systems: their feasibility, scalability, security,
and potential implementations. The unique constraints and costs stemming from
the underlying blockchain systems and the nascent nature of decentralized organi-
zations demand focus; thus, the viability and implementation of several electoral
systems is explored. Smart contract implementations, written in Solidity, are pro-
vided which offer insights into the potential designs, pitfalls, and costs required to
support various electoral systems and features. This research demonstrates that
secure and verifiable small-scale voting systems can be built using “off-the-shelf”
blockchain technologies which support code-execution; however, this is likely only
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possible where privacy, anonymity, and receipt freedom constraints are loosened.
This research further demonstrates that the costs associated with operating such
voting systems are steep, likely rendering such systems impractical in most circum-
stances and therefore an inappropriate foundation for large-scale elections. Finally,
this research identifies which electoral systems and features are viable within these
blockchain environments and the associated cost of supporting and operating these
electoral systems and features.
Some of the questions this research initially sought to answer includes:
1. What modalities of governance and electoral systems exist?
2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of these electoral systems?
3. What kinds of election processes and procedures, governance modalities, and
electoral systems are appropriate within blockchain ecosystems and decentral-
ized organizations?
4. Of the election processes available, which are blockchain ecosystems capable of
supporting?
5. What is the current state of research with respect to digital and online voting?
6. Can blockchain technologies be leveraged to improve the reliability, verifiability,
or security of elections?
5
1.1 Overview of Materials
This material is divided into six chapters:
1. Introduction, which introduces this material, poses initial questions, and an
offers overview of the subject matter to be reviewed.
2. Background, which introduces background materials regarding:
• Elections and Electoral Systems, their modalities, component parts, risks,
an overview of some of the most common implementations of electoral
systems, and an introduction to the tools available for analyzing and
selecting electoral systems.
• Blockchain Technologies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, their basic concepts and
abstractions, internal data structures, algorithms, network architectures
and topologies, the properties thereof, and the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM).
3. Literature Review, which introduces and explores:
• Internet Voting, its general procedures and requirements, reviews several
novel Internet voting experiments: their architectures, criticisms, and
outcomes.
• End-to-End Verifiable Voting, its purpose, the requirements to support
end-to-end verifiability (technical and non-functional), architectural op-
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tions, existing systems, and common cryptographic techniques available
for use in electoral systems.
4. Methods, which covers the methodologies used within this work, borrowing
from the tools and methodologies, introduced in Chapter 2’s Background, for
selecting electoral systems, and from the technical and non-functional require-
ments introduced in Chapter 3’s Literature Review on end-to-end verifiability:
• Requirements and Design Principles, the guiding principles and require-
ments which this research aims to support.
• Architecture and Implementation, the overall design to support various
electoral systems: registration and authorization of voters, voter repre-
sentation and vote delegation, vote casting and tallying processes, and
contracts for holding elections backed by various electoral systems: First-
Past-the-Post (FPTP), Range Vote (RV), etc.
5. Results, which reviews the results produced through methodologies covered in
Chapter 4’s Methods in two parts:
• Test Results, the testing methodologies and frameworks leveraged, an
analysis of the algorithmic complexities, election simulations and costs,
and test results of the various electoral systems implemented.
• Analysis, which reviews the shortcomings, limitations, and areas of im-
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provement required with respect to the methodologies chosen in Chapter
4’s Methods, offers an interpretation of the results produced in Chapter
5’s Results, takes a look back at the initial questions introduced in Chap-
ter 1’s Introduction, offers some context and perspective with respect to
how this material fits into the greater body of previous work, and offers
some suggestions for future work.
6. Conclusion, summarizes the material covered in the previous chapters, reviews
the major results produced in this work, and offers closing thoughts.
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Chapter 2 – Background
This chapter is broken into two major sections:
• Elections, which examines the modalities, component parts, and risks involved
when selecting electoral systems; provides an overview of some common and
relevant electoral systems; and introduces tools available for analyzing and
selecting electoral systems.
• Blockchain Technologies, which examines Bitcoin and Ethereum, their inter-
nal data structures, algorithms, network topology, architecture, and properties
thereof.
2.1 Elections
Elections are perhaps the most obvious and intuitive means of allowing mem-
bers of a population to express their will and take part in their governance process.
An election is the generalized process of allowing individuals to express their pref-
erence, typically by way of vote, as a means to come to consensus as a group. The
9
generalized goal of elections is to reach a consensus which accurately and fairly re-
flects the preferences of the participating voters. This, at first glance, seems like a
trivial problem, and generally is in circumstances where the number of voters and
choices is small in number. However, elections become complex as the number of
actors, choices, or election cycles increase. There are social, mathematical, and prac-
tical engineering constraints which all voting systems are bound by, subjected to,
and forced to address.
Electoral Systems
An electoral system, is the combination of rules, norms, and procedures which
define how a final result, and ultimately consensus, will be determined during an elec-
tion. Electoral systems can considered as a composition of three components: ballot,
choices, and tallying algorithm. These three components can be woven together to
produce a wide spectrum of electoral systems with varying characteristics and prop-
erties. The choice and implementation of electoral system has a direct and profound
impact on the ways in which democratic systems can and will operate as well as
on the perceived legitimacy of the governance model. The decisions concerning the
implementation details of electoral systems are among the most important decisions
that any democratic organization will make; the choice of design impacts all future
10
decision making processes and shapes the future of the governance model itself. A
poorly designed electoral system can have disastrous effects on the health and per-
ceived legitimacy of a democratic organization both in the immediate and long-term
future. Further, once chosen, an electoral system can be difficult to amend as polit-
ical interests respond to and solidify around the incentives presented to them which
are inherent to the electoral system chosen. [39]
Choices A electoral system’s choices are the set of options that a voting actor can
select from; they are the who or what being decided in an election. The choices
available may be determined by primary vote, polling, write-in, debate, etc. or some
other methodology or combination of methodologies.
District Magnitude The number of choices that will be selected as winners
is of great importance in an election. In representative democracies the measurement
of seats (choices) available is known as district magnitude. An election where the
district magnitude is one, i.e., where a single candidate or choice is to be elected or
selected, is known as a single-member district (SMD) or single-winner district. An
election where the district magnitude is greater than one, i.e., multiple candidates are
to be elected, is known as a multi-member district (MMD) or multi-winner district.
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Ballot A ballot is the means through which voting actors express their vote. The
structure of the ballot influences exactly how the voter can express their preferences
for a choice or choices, e.g., how many votes an individual is able to cast. This is
directly influenced by the tallying method. Ballots, in some texts, are regarded as a
process of voting; here the term is used to describe both the medium through which
a voting actor marks their choice (e.g., paper, punch card, or electronic machine),
as well as the rules regarding how they can mark said medium. The ballot might be
thought of as the data structure used to support the tallying algorithm.
Preference Marking Preference marking is a ballot marking process where
the electorate is given an opportunity to rank choices: cardinally, ordinally, or by
approval. This expression of preference offers greater insights and details into the
will and desires of the electorate and can be used by the tallying method and election
officials to more optimally determine winners in an election. Preference marking may
be mandatory or optional depending on the design of the electoral system.
Electoral Formula The electoral formula is the process used to translate ballots
into winning decisions. The electoral formula is best characterized by its tallying
method, and in multi-member districts, its proportionality.
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Tallying Method The tallying method, or tallying algorithm, is closely
tied to how a voter is allowed to mark a ballot and affects how a marked ballot is
ultimately counted in the final tally of an election. Different processes of varying
complexities exist to count votes. Naturally, the process through which votes are
tallied will have a direct and significant influence on the outcome of an election.
Proportionality Proportionality characterizes how closely votes cast trans-
late into choices won. The significance of proportionality becomes especially relevant
as the district magnitude increases. The closer in proportion that winning choices
are to the votes cast for them, the greater the system expresses proportionality. An-
alyzing the votes cast and how they map to winning choices and “wasted votes” is
the easiest method to determine the proportionality of an electoral formula and is
commonly expressed as the index of disproportionality.
2.1.1 A Taxonomy of Electoral Systems
Electoral systems are generally broken into three broad families based pri-
marily on the properties described above. The three families are plurality/majority,
proportional representation, and mixed. An overview various electoral systems is
offered in Table 2.1 to help visualize the landscape of electoral systems available and
where they fall.
13





STV Single Transferable Vote •
List PR •
FPTP First Past The Post •
BV Block Vote • •
PBV Party Block Vote • •
Preferential Block Vote • •
AV Alternative Vote •
RV Range Vote •
TRS Two-Round System • •
Parallel • • • • •
MMP Mixed-Member Proportional • • • • •
MMD: Multi-Member District, a district where multiple seats are available for candidates to hold or where multiple
choices will be determined winners.
2.1.1.1 Plurality/Majority
Plurality and majority electoral systems are simple in principle although not
necessarily in design. After votes have been tallied the choices with the most resulting
votes are the decided winners.
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Plurality Voting A plurality voting system is one where the winning choices are
the ones with the greatest number of votes but not necessarily an absolute majority.
The United States uses plurality electoral systems almost exclusively.
First-Past-The-Post First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) is a plurality single-member
district electoral system used widely across the world and almost exclusively in the
United States of America. FPTP is one of the simplest electoral systems to under-
stand; the voter is presented with a set of choices on a ballot and is able to select one
and only one of the choices. The ballots are then collected and tallied by counting
the number of votes cast for each choice; the choice with the most votes wins.
Majority Voting A majority voting system is characterized such that a choice will
only be considered the winner with an absolute majority of votes, that is, greater
than 50% of the votes. Most majority voting systems take advantage of preference
marking or multiple election cycles, where less-popular choices are removed in each
cycle, to form a majority.
Range Vote Range Vote (RV), also known as Score Voting (SV), is a single-
member district majority electoral system. It takes advantage of cardinally preference
marked ballots to determine a majority choice. This form of voting allows voters
to express a preference between choices and also the degree of preference between
15
choices.
A range voting ballot allows voters to select a non-negative integer, up to
some maximum (usually 9 or 99), which expresses some degree of approval for a
particular option, e.g., 0 for least preferred or 9 for most preferred. Some range
voting systems also allow for disapproval voting, down to some minimum, to express
disapproval for a particular option, but this is less common. The system may also
support a “No Opinion” mark that can be cast if a voter is ignorant or indifferent
to some choice; this is usually considered the default mark if no mark is made for
a particular option and does not count for or against the option. Once all ballots
are cast and collected they are tallied. The tallying process is as follows: votes for
an option are summed together and divided by the number of ballots that actively
voted for that option (marked anything other than “No Opinion”). The option with
the highest average score wins.
An approval voting system is the simplest and most restricted kind of range
voting, the range of votes is restricted to either 0 or 1. A voter can approve as many
options as they want.
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2.1.1.2 Proportional Representation
The objective of a Proportional Representation (PR) electoral system is to
produce winners from an election that accurately reflect the will of the people and
the votes they cast by reducing the disparity between shares of votes cast for choices
and shares of winning choices; this is especially relevant when considering seats won
in a representative governance models. PR operates by providing a cross section of
winners in an election which map proportionally to the votes cast for choices. For
example, if a quarter of voters in an election desire some outcome then the election
results should reflect that by producing winners in proportion to those voters’ desires;
i.e., a quarter of the winners of the election should be that of the voters’ desired
outcome.
There are a number of benefits associated with PR systems:
• Votes translate into choices won with greater proportionality.
• Results in fewer wasted votes.
• Offers minority groups greater representation.
• Restricts regional fiefdoms.
• Promotes greater long-term political health and negotiation.
• Results in greater voter participation and perceived legitimacy.
• Supports a more inclusive cross-section of representatives.
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There are also several disadvantages associated with PR systems:
• Quick and coherent policies can be difficult to pass.
• Legislative gridlock can occur when factions are formed.
• Fragmentation of strong parties can occur in cases of extreme pluralism.
• Minority parties can hold parties ransom in coalition negotiation, thus offering
smaller parties greater authority than perhaps deserved.
• It is difficult to enforce accountability by throwing out parties or candidates.
• Potentially difficult for electorate to understand or administrators to imple-
ment.
Single Transferable Vote Single Transferable Vote (STV) is a PR multi-member
electoral system that operates similar to the Alternative Vote (AV). Like AV, STV
leverages preference marked ballots. STV operates as follows. Electorate ordinally
rank options on their ballots. Ballots are collected and tallied. While tallying, if
any option reaches the quota, i.e., receives the minimum number of votes required,
they are immediately declared a winner in the election and awarded a seat for the
district. Surplus votes for a winning candidate are redistributed to other candidates
based on ballot-preference. If the quota cannot be reached by any candidate then
the least popular candidate is eliminated and votes are redistributed based on bal-
lot-preference. [46]
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There are many quota algorithm implementations which can be used in STV
elections. The quota algorithm used will determine the minimum number of votes
required to win a seat in an election. One such quota algorithm, perhaps the most





If the quota for winning is met surplus vote allocation occurs, surplus votes are re-
distributed to second choices. STV implementations can differ here. It would not
necessarily be fair to select only some people to have their votes redistributed, since
voters can have different second choices. However, it might be acceptable if surplus
ballots were randomly selected for second choices. In large enough elections with
large enough surpluses the second choices should be statistically proportional. How-
ever, non-deterministic winners are not ideal and can lead to infinite recursion in
some cases. Instead, everyone’s votes (from ballots whose candidate won) can be
redistributed to their second choices (or third, fourth, etc. if their second has already
won) as a fraction of a vote; this algorithm will usually be based on surplus votes,
total votes, previous votes, etc. There are many surplus allocation algorithms. [39]
There are also surplus vote allocation algorithms for subsequent surplus vote alloca-
tion, for when a second choice has already won. [39,46]
When no option can win excluded candidate vote allocation occurs, the weak-
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est options are eliminated and their votes reallocated. There are also a number of
algorithms available when deciding how votes should be redistributed which options
are eliminated. [39]
2.1.2 Evaluating Electoral Systems
Given the wide range of electoral systems that exist, or could conceivably
exist, it becomes necessary to introduce techniques that can be used to objectively
analyze and evaluate the various characteristics of electoral systems. Social choice
theory provides tools which one can use to examine and categorize voting systems:
by their advantages, their disadvantages, and caveats.
2.1.2.1 Criteria
It can be difficult to objectively judge and select an electoral system; the
choice of electoral system will have impacts on the groups, ideologies, and candidates
that are likely to succeed in a given governance model, and the consequences of
an electoral system are not always immediately obvious. In order to compare and
contrast electoral systems more objectively, there are criteria that exist to express and
describe some characteristic of an electoral system. Table 2.2 provides a summary
of criteria compliance across various electoral systems to help visualize the unique
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range of compliance across various electoral systems. The criteria fall into four major
categories:
1. Absolute Result Criteria,
2. Relative Result Criteria,
3. Ballot Counting Criteria, and
4. Strategy Criteria.
Table 2.2: Electoral Criteria Compliance [44,39,20,31,36]







































































Rated           
Majority Loser            
Mutual Majority            
Condorcet            
Condorcet Loser            
Smith/IDSA            
LIIA            
IIA            
Cloneproof            
Monotone            
Consistency            
Participation            
Reversal Symmetry            
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Table 2.2: Electoral Criteria Compliance [44,39,20,31,36]






































































Polytime O(n) O(n) O(n2) O(n2) O(n!) O(n) O(n) O(n3) O(n) O(n3) O(1) O(n)
Resolvable            
Summable O(n) O(n) O(n2) O(n!) O(n2) O(n) O(n) O(n2) O(n) O(n2) O(1) O(n)
Later-no-Harm      −      
Later-no-Help      −      
No Favorite Betrayal            
Ballot Type ✓          − 
Ranks =      −   −  − −
Ranks >2           − 
 Criterion is supported.
 Criterion is unsupported.
− Criterion is not applicable.
? Criterion is supported under some conditions.
 Choices are cardinally ranked by preference.
 Choices are ordinally ranked by preference.
 Vulnerable to spoilers.
 Vulnerable to teams.
 Vulnerable to crowds.
✓ Multiple yes/no choice-selections supported.
 Single yes/no choice-selection supported.
Absolute Result Criteria The absolute criteria express whether a candidate
must or must not win given the state of some ballots. [37,20,21]
Majority Criterion The Majority Criterion (MC) states that a candidate
who is preferred by a majority of voters must win. This is expressed in two flavors:
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1. Ranked, when a choice is preferred by a majority of voters, the choice must
win.
2. Rated, when a choice is given a perfect score by a majority of voters, the choice
must win.
In a ranked electoral systems these two majority criteria are identical in nature.
Mutual Majority Criterion The Mutual Majority Criterion (MMC) states
that if a subset, S, of candidates is strictly preferred over every candidate in the ab-
solute complement of subset S, then the winner must come from subset S.
Condorcet Criterion The Condorcet criterion states that a choice who
beats out every other choice in a pairwise comparison will win.
Condorcet Loser Criterion The Condorcet loser criterion states that a
choice who loses to every other choice in a pairwise comparison will always lose.
Relative Result Criteria The relative result criteria express when a candidate
should or should not win given a win in a similar circumstance. [20,21,37]
Independence of Smith-dominated Alternatives Independence of Smith-
dominated Alternatives (ISDA) states that an added or removed Smith-dominated
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choice, one which would lose in direct pairwise competition with every other choice,
will not affect the result of the contest.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives (IIA) is a criterion which states that adding or removing a non-winning
candidate should not impact the end result.
Local Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Local Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (LIIA) is a criterion which states that removing a candidate
will not disrupt the transitive ordering.
Independence of Clone Alternatives The independence of clone alter-
natives, cloneproof, states that the outcome will not change if non-winning candidates
similar to an existing candidate are added as choices. There are three flavors which
fail independence of clones:
1. Spoilers, which are clone negative choices that decrease the chance of a similar
choice winning by spreading votes across multiple choices.
2. Teams, which are clone positive similar choices that together increase the
chance of their winning.
3. Crowds, which are non-winning choices that when cloned change the winner
without themselves becoming the winner.
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Monotonicity Criterion The monotonicity criterion, monotone, states
that ranking a winning choice higher will not impact the end result.
Consistency Criterion The Consistency Criterion (CC) states that a win-
ning choice in two complement sets of ballots should remain the winner in a final
tally combining the two sets.
Participation Criterion The Participation Criterion (PC) states that vot-
ing honestly will always produce better results than not voting at all.
Reversal Symmetry The reversal symmetry criterion states that when
individual voter preferences are universally inverted the original winner will never
win.
Ballot Counting Criteria Ballot counting criteria concern the process of vote
tallying and winner determination. These criteria are especially important with
respect to the practical implementation of an electoral system. [44,39,6]
Polynomial Time The polynomial time criterion, polytime, states that the
electoral system can calculate the winner in linear time with respect to the number
of voters and in polynomial time with respect to the number of candidates.
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Resolvable A resolvable electoral system is one where determining a winner
should be entirely deterministic, i.e., the electoral system should not depend on
random processes such as coin flipping. This criterion is less important in large
elections where ties are unlikely to occur.
Summability Summability is a criterion used to express how computation-
ally complex it is to store vote data in a compressed format, and consequentially,
how difficult it is to pre-tally votes at individual polling stations and transmit those
tallied results to a central counting authority for final counting. Votes are expected
to be mapped to a summable array which can be used to determine the winner. The
summability criterion is considered kth-order summable if we can map n candidates
to a matrix of size nk. If no k exists the electoral system is considered non-summable.
Strategy Criteria The strategy criteria relate to the incentives and ability for
voters to vote using some strategy to produce a desired election result. [44,5,39]
Later-no-Harm Criterion This criterion states that ranking a preference
later on a ballot will not harm a choice already listed.
Later-no-Help Criterion This criterion states that ranking a preference
later on a ballot will not help a choice already listed.
26
No Favorite Betrayal No Favorite Betrayal (NFB) states that ranking a
choice above your preferred choice will not produce a more desirable or preferred
result.
Ballot Format The ballot formats define how a voter is able to express themselves
on a ballot. [39]
Ballot Type The ballot type defines how a voter is permitted to mark
their ballot. Popular ballot types include single mark, approval, ranked (ordinal),
and scored (cardinal).
Equal Ranks A ballot that allows a voter to express equal support for
multiple candidates is said to support equal ranks.
Over 2 Ranks A ballot which allows a voter to express interest for a choice
in non-binary terms is said to support over 2 ranks, e.g., ordinal and cardinal ballots.
2.2 Blockchain Technologies
This research considers the utility of blockchain technologies with respect to
election systems. A blockchain is a distributed transactional database system that
tracks transactions in ever-growing linked blocks. Blockchain technologies have been
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used to create immutable public ledgers for tracking currency, assets, and rights data.
The most notable technology blockchain technology in use today is Bitcoin.
Blockchain technology exists to provide a solution to the Byzantine Generals’
Problem in a distributed computing environment.1 It allows parties on an untrusted
and unreliable network to build a trusted source of truth for transaction history.
Blockchains use various algorithms to score different versions of transaction history
over time to reach consensus within their network. Blockchains might be best de-
scribed as a tool used to commodify trust.
There are interesting overlaps and parallels to be drawn from the consensus
mechanisms used in these, and other computer networks, and the consensus mecha-
nisms leveraged to make decisions as a group in democratic governance systems.
1The Byzantine Generals’ Problem is a thought experiment which helps to illustrate some of
the difficulties regarding coordination over untrusted networks. In short, two generals wish to
coordinate an attack on an enemy fortress. They must attack simultaneously to succeed in taking
the fortress. However, the general’s only means of coordination is via courier, and the only routes
available for the couriers to travel necessitate travel through the fortress. How do the generals




In 2008 the seminal white paper, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System, was published under the moniker Satoshi Nakamoto. [35] This white paper
outlined ideas for a new form of currency, Bitcoin. Bitcoin promised to be the
first of its kind; it would become the world’s first decentralized digital currency
that would require no trust to authenticate timestamped transactions. It would do
this by combining cryptography, a proof-of-work system, and “miners” to create a
revolutionary new concept that is now known as blockchain technology. In short,
blockchain technology enables individuals who do not trust one another to reach
consensus via a trustless platform. More concretely, Bitcoin can be used by Alice
and Bob to send money from one to the other over a decentralized network.
2.2.1.1 Network Topology
The Bitcoin network is structured as a peer-to-peer network composed of a
variety of node types. Each node supports varying functionalities and features based
on their use case. Common functionalities and features required include: [2]
• Mining functionality, to support creating new blocks by solving proof-of-work
problems.
• A wallet, to offer users a way to manage their keys plus send and receive
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transactions.
• A copy of the full blockchain, which allows nodes to verify transactions inde-
pendent of other nodes in the network.
• Network routing capabilities, which allows nodes to propagate transactions and
discover new nodes.
Node Types The most common node types, classified by their corresponding func-
tionalities, are as follows: [2]
• A reference client contains wallet, miner, a full copy of the blockchain, and
network routing functionality.
• A full node contains a full copy of the blockchain and network routing func-
tionality.
• A mining node contains a miner, a full copy of the blockchain, and network
routing functionality.
• A lightweight wallet contains a wallet and network routing functionality. These
nodes depend on full nodes to verify transactions for them. These nodes are




The Bitcoin blockchain is structured as a linked list of blocks, as seen in
Figure 2.1. Each block contains a set of transactions and a reference to the previous
block in the chain. Blocks are identified by the SHA-256 hash of its header. It is
helpful to imagine the blockchain as being blocks stacked vertically, each additional






















































Figure 2.1: A chain of linked Bitcoin blocks. [35]
Blocks The block is the Bitcoin blockchain primitive. Blocks serve as a time-
stamping tool for transactions within the network and also prove that some amount
of work (computation) occurred. The contents of a block are listed in Table 2.3.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the layout of a block.
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Table 2.3: The contents of a block [2].
Size Field Description
4 bytes Block Size The size of the block, in bytes, following this field
80 bytes Block Header Several fields form the block header
1–9 bytes (VarInt) Transaction Counter How many transactions follow


















Figure 2.2: A single Bitcoin block and its internal representation. [35]
Block Header The block header is responsible for tracking the metadata
of the Bitcoin block. It is also used to represent the block as a whole by SHA-256
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hashing the contents of it. The contents of the block header are as seen in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: The contents of a block header [2].
Size Field Description
4 bytes Version A version number to track software/protocol upgrades
32 bytes Previous Block Hash A reference to the hash of the previous (parent) block in the chain
32 bytes Merkle Root A hash of the root of the Merkle tree of this block’s transactions
4 bytes Timestamp The approximate creation time of this block (seconds from Unix Epoch)
4 bytes Difficulty Target The proof-of-work algorithm difficulty target for this block
4 bytes Nonce A counter used for the proof-of-work algorithm
Merkle Trees AMerkle tree is a data structure that allows one to efficiently
verify the contents of a large amount of data. Merkle trees are used extensively in
peer-to-peer networks to ensure that blocks of data arrive unaltered and undamaged.
The root of a Merkle tree is called a Merkle root. Merkle trees are composed of nodes
of hashes. They have the unique property of allowing the verification of the existence
of a hash in the tree in O(log(n)) time.
Transactions In Satoshi’s original white paper, a coin was defined as tokens trans-
ferred via a chain of digital signatures.
“We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner
transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous
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transaction and the public key of the next owner and adding these to the
































Figure 2.3: A chain of signatures representing an electronic coin. [35]
Figure 2.3 demonstrates Owner 1 hashing the transaction that gave her own-
ership of the coin with the public key of the new owner (Owner 2), then signing that
hash with her private key and publishing that as a new transaction. Owner 2 repeats
the process to send his coins to Owner 3.
Proof-of-Work The bitcoin protocol uses a Proof-Of-Work (POW) algorithm sim-
ilar to hashcash. [4,35] The goal of this proof-of-work algorithm is to create a problem
that is easy to verify for correctness but difficult to solve for. The proof-of-work al-
gorithm provides a means for mining nodes to be pseudorandomly selected to build
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a block of transactions. The probability that a miner will be selected is directly tied
to the amount of work a miner does.
Algorithm The proof-of-work algorithm depends on the SHA-256 crypto-
graphic hashing function, a member of the Secure Hash Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) family,
which produces a 256-bit, 32-byte, hash result.
The primary requirements which a cryptographic hash function must fulfill
are that it be:
• deterministic, i.e., the same input will always produce the same output,
• quick to compute,
• infeasible to determine the input from the output, i.e., a small change in the
input will produce a major, seemingly random, change to the output, and
• infeasible to find a collision in resulting hashes.
These properties of cryptographic hash functions provide collision resistance,
meaning it is computationally infeasible to find an input that produces a randomly
selected hash output. This property of collision resistance is leveraged to build the
pseudorandom selection process that determines which node is able to build the next
block of transactions.
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Difficulty The Bitcoin network has a global difficulty — a 256-bit, 32-byte,
value — that is recalculated every 2016 blocks. The value is recalculated such that
the pseudorandom “mining” process to mint a new block will take approximately 10
minutes to complete for each block minted.
While it is helpful to describe miners as being “selected” to build, or mint,
new blocks, it is also inaccurate; in reality miners have a chance of building a correct
block which can be measured as a probability, i.e., the miner’s hash rate relative to
the total network hash rate: miner_hashrate
network_hashrate .
Miners repeatedly compute SHA-256 hashes, combining the previous block’s
header hash, the current block data, and a nonce (a pseudorandom shifting value
selected by the miner). The miner’s objective is to find a nonce which produces a
hash less than the current difficulty. Due to the properties of the SHA-256 hash this
process is, practically speaking, a brute-force processes of trial and error, (the “work”
in Proof-of-Work). Once a miner has discovered a valid hash they have generated a
valid block.
Network Once a miner generates a valid block it will propagate its solution
into the network. Other nodes will then verify that the block is correct and will
append it to their chain. One of the transactions which miners will include in their
block is a coinbase transaction, a transaction containing reward paid to the miner in
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the form of newly minted bitcoin.
Security These properties, combined with the incentive of coinbase re-
wards, provide security in the form of cryptography, electricity, and hardware. At-
tacks that would threaten this security depend on breaking the cryptographic primi-
tives in action, finding ways of reducing electricity/hardware costs to outperform the
rest of the network in the PoW algorithm, attacking nodes in the network, or col-
luding with other nodes in the network to outperform the remainder of the network.
2.2.1.3 Example Transaction: Alice to Bob
As an example, we might imagine a circumstance where Alice wants to send
Bob 0.100 BTC. Assume Alice controls two addresses:
1. 1PwDUn9Vxn9CyaRkZfJrTzYRg6QNCygALY , which contains 6900000 satoshis (0.069 BTC).
2. 1Ah1CWQ1Zxax2yzg3EZBmSmZTKDoHTuUAi , which contains 7900000 satoshis (0.079 BTC).
Alice does not have enough bitcoin in either address independently to send
Bob the 0.100 BTC. To resolve this Alice creates a new transaction which takes as an
input both of her addresses. Alice proves she controls both addresses by signing each
transaction address and publishing her public key for each respectively. This process
allows a node on the bitcoin network to verify both that public key is associated with
the address (through a series of cryptographic hashes) and that the person publishing
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this transaction controls the private keys (by verifying the signature). Next Alice
sets an output address to Bob’s address, an amount to send to Bob (0.100 BTC), and
the rules Bob must fulfill to access the bitcoin she is sending to him (typically signing
the transaction and publishing the associated public key). Alice could now publish
this transaction to the bitcoin network; however, in doing so she would sacrifice
0.048 BTC, the remainder from her two addresses, which the miners would claim as
a transaction fee. To avoid this Alice can set a second transaction output address to
an address she controls, sending any additional coins there that she does not want
to offer as a transaction fee.
2.2.2 Ethereum
Ethereum is a blockchain-based system initially proposed in late 2013, post-
Bitcoin, and released in 2015. [9] Ethereum introduced a few novel features and func-
tionalities with its blockchain network which are not available in the Bitcoin network.
Most notably Ethereum offers a distributed decentralized Turing-complete comput-
ing platform via the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), which aims to provide an
application layer which “[runs] exactly as programmed without any possibility of
downtime, censorship, fraud or third party interference.” [17,51]
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2.2.2.1 Fundamental Concepts
Currency Like Bitcoin, Ethereum’s blockchain defines and leverages its own token,
ether — also referred to as eth or ETH, and sometimes denoted using the Greek
symbol Xi, Ξ, the uppercase Old English letter Eth, Ð, or, more rarely, ♦ — which
acts as the underlying currency of its blockchain protocol. The smallest unit of ether
is wei. [3,51] The denominations of ether are broken down as follows:
Table 2.5: Ether Denominations [3]
Value (in wei) Exponent Common
Name
SI Name
1 100 wei Wei
1,000 103 Babbage Kilowei or femtoether
1,000,000 106 Lovelace Megawei or picoether
1,000,000,000 109 Shannon Gigawei or nanoether
1,000,000,000,000 1012 Szabo Microether or micro
1,000,000,000,000,000 1015 Finney Milliether or milli
1,000,000,000,000,000,000 1018 Ether Ether
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 1021 Grand Kiloether
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 1024 Megaether
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Accounts Accounts are an Ethereum primitive which provide an abstraction over
the Bitcoin equivalent signature chain process; this abstraction helps to both simplify
the concept of token ownership as well as extend the idea of what a token is, what
a token can be, and how blockchain state can be managed and organized.
Accounts are identified by a 160-bit code, their address, and are internally
represented by four properties:
1. nonce , a monotonically increasing counter which represents the number of
transactions sent from the account.
2. balance , the amount of ether, expressed in wei, which is owned by the account.
3. storageRoot , a 256-bit hash of the root node of a Merkle Patricia tree which
encodes the storage contents of the account.
4. codeHash , an immutable hash of the EVM code corresponding to the account.
Although all accounts are structurally identical it is useful to distinguish be-
tween the two practical kinds of accounts which one is likely to encounter and interact
with on the Ethereum blockchain, external accounts and internal accounts:
External Accounts — also referred to as simple accounts, non-contract accounts,
externally owned accounts (EOA), and sometimes user accounts — are defined
as accounts whose codeHash value is the Keccak-256 hash of an empty string;
i.e., the account contains no code.
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Internal Accounts — also referred to as contract accounts — are those accounts
which are not external accounts; i.e., the account contains code.
Both kinds of accounts have the ability to send and receive ether as well as inter-
act with contracts which have been deployed to the Ethereum network. However,
there are some key differences between the two kinds of accounts which are worth
highlighting: [18]
External Accounts
‚ External accounts are managed by public-key cryptography.
‚ External account creation costs no ether.
‚ Only external accounts can initiate transactions.
‚ Transactions between external accounts can only transact ether.
Internal Accounts
‚ Internal accounts are managed by code.
‚ Internal account creation costs ether which reflects the cost of storing code
on the Ethereum network.
‚ Internal accounts can execute code via the EVM upon receiving transac-
tions, enabling a wide range network functionalities.
‚ Internal accounts can only send transactions in response to receiving
transactions.
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Transactions A transaction is a cryptographically-signed instruction constructed
by an external actor and submitted to the Ethereum network. There are two kinds
of transactions worth distinguishing, contract creation transactions and message call
transactions; both kinds of transactions share the following common properties:
1. to , a 160-bit address representing the recipient’s account. This value is omitted
when building a contract creation transaction.
2. from , a signature which identifies the sender of the transaction by account
address.2
3. value , the amount of ether, expressed in wei, which is to be transferred to the
recipient.
4. nonce , a value equal to the number of transactions which have been sent by
the sender.
5. gasPrice , a value representing the amount of wei to be paid per unit of gas
(expanded on below).
6. gasLimit , a value representing the maximum amount of gas which should be
used executing the transaction.
Contract creation transactions include the following additional property in
2This field does not technically exist, in actuality the signature is represented as three distinct
fields (v, r, s), which can be used to determine the address representing the sender of the transaction.
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the transaction:
1. init , an EVM-code fragment which is executed only once and discarded there-
after; it returns the body , a second fragment of code that executes each time
the account receives a message call, which can occur either by transaction or
internal execution of code.
In contrast, a message call transaction includes the following additional prop-
erty:
1. data , an unlimited size byte array which contains the input data of the message
call.
Ethereum Virtual Machine The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is the ex-
ecution environment which Ethereum code is processed in. The EVM processes
low-level bytecode and takes actions against the state of the Ethereum blockchain
in response: reading, processing, and writing data. The Ethereum Virtual Machine
Specification introduces a low-level instruction set which defines the available op-
erations which an EVM implementation should support: the opcodes, their inputs,
outputs, and various other implementation details. The EVM can be described as a
state transition function, Y (S, T ) = S 1; given a set of transactions, T , and an initial
state, S, the state transition function, Y (S, T ), will produce a new output state,
S 1. [51] Several EVM implementations exist which have been written in various lan-
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guages, e.g., Go, Python, and C++.
Language Support Several higher-level languages exist which target the
Ethereum Virtual Machine and can be used to build “smart contracts;” e.g., Solidity
which draws inspiration from C++ and JavaScript, and Vyper which describes itself
as a “Pythonic Smart Contract Language.” These languages ship with compilers
which can be used to translate their code into low-level EVM bytecode; Solidity, for
example, is compiled using solc, the Solidity compiler.
2.2.2.2 Network Topology
Like Bitcoin, Ethereum exists as a network of nodes, each node supporting dif-
fering functionalities, which work collectively to construct the Ethereum blockchain
and support the surrounding ecosystem. These nodes can be classified by the func-
tionalities which they support.
Node Types There exists several implementations of the Ethereum protocol, i.e.,
Ethereum clients, which have been written in various languages, e.g., Geth in Go,
Parity in Rust, and pyethereum in Python. Some of these clients support running in
different modes.
• A full node is a complete implementation of the Ethereum protocol. A full
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nodes processes and validates all transactions which have been added to the
Ethereum blockchain, thus helping to support the resiliency and reliability
of the network. To support this functionality, a full node must maintain a
complete copy of the blockchain. Full nodes are also capable of deploying and
interacting with contracts, support mining and wallet functionality, and are
able to route transactions throughout the network.
• A remote client supports a subset of the functionality that a full node supports,
generally wallet functionality and the ability to broadcast transactions. Other
more complex functionalities generally require interacting with with a full node
or other remote services which are capable of fulfilling requests on a remote
client’s behalf.
The Blockchain Like Bitcoin, the Ethereum blockchain is constructed by lever-
aging a Proof-of-Work (PoW) algorithm to reach consensus throughout the network.
The proof-of-work algorithm leveraged by Ethereum, Ethash, helps to build trust
and reliability throughout the network while also securing the blockchain and ensur-
ing that EVM code execution has been processed and that the results produced from
said execution are as expected. Ethereum offers cryptoeconomic incentivization in
the form of ether to promote participation in the proof-of-work process. [51]
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Blocks The Ethereum protocol groups collections of transactions into blocks.
Blocks are linked to previous blocks, via cryptographic hash, which reflect the prior
states of the blockchain. When processed collectively these blocks reflect the current
state of the Ethereum blockchain.
Proof-of-Work Ethereum’s proof-of-work algorithm, Ethash, is a proof-of-
work algorithm which was initially inspired by the Hashimoto and Dagger algorithms.
The primary motivation behind the Ethash algorithm was to produce a PoW algo-
rithm which would be resistant to application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs).
The primary mechanism leveraged to achieve ASIC-resistance lies in the algorithm’s
memory-bound nature: a significant amount of memory, in addition to computa-
tion, is required to correctly compute a proof-of-work solution. By requiring large
amounts of memory-bound operations the algorithm makes itself resistant to most
kinds of specialized memories and caches. Additionally, the memory requirements
are designed to grow and shift over time such that building rapid static caches would
become prohibitively expensive. In some sense the Ethash algorithm might be better
described as Proof-of-Memory. [10,14,8]
The Ethereum network has been attempting to migrate away from Ethash
to a lower-cost consensus algorithm operating through Proof-of-Stake (PoS) but has
yet to complete the transition.
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Gas In order to validate that EVM code has been executed, and executed
as expected, each full node on the network must recompute all transactions and
whatever EVM code those transactions have triggered when validating blocks. It is
not difficult to imagine how this might cause serious problems and introduce room
for exploitation within the network, while true { expensiveOperation() } . In order to
address this the Ethereum specification introduces an abstraction, gas, which has
a market-based value and must be paid by the transaction-sender up-front when
generating a transaction. Each operation computed by the EVM has an associated
gas-price and that gas price is “paid” to the node who successfully mints a block. If
an insufficient amount of gas is provided by the transaction-sender then the EVM
will throw an out-of-gas (OOG) exception: execution halts, the blockchain state is
restored, and all gas submitted is forfeited to the node. If an excess of gas is provided
then any gas remaining after transaction execution is refunded to the sender. When
generating a transaction on the Ethereum network the creator of the transaction has
the choice of defining how much wei they are willing to pay per unit of gas. Nodes
are incentivized to process transactions which offer more wei per unit of gas relative
to the rest of the transactions available for processing on the network. Table 2.6
introduces gas costs as defined by the Ethereum Yellow Paper.
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Table 2.6: Fee Schedule [51]
Name Value Description*
Gzero 0 Nothing paid for operations of the set Wzero.
Gbase 2 Amount of gas to pay for operations of the set Wbase.
Gverylow 3 Amount of gas to pay for operations of the set Wverylow.
Glow 5 Amount of gas to pay for operations of the set Wlow.
Gmid 8 Amount of gas to pay for operations of the set Wmid.
Ghigh 10 Amount of gas to pay for operations of the set Whigh.
Gextcode 700 Amount of gas to pay for operations of the set Wextcode.
Gbalance 400 Amount of gas to pay for a BALANCE operation.
Gsload 200 Paid for a SLOAD operation.
Gjumpdest 1 Paid for a JUMPDEST operation.
Gsset 20000 Paid for an SSTORE operation when the storage value is set to non-zero from zero.
Gsreset 5000 Paid for an SSTORE operation when the storage value’s zeroness remains unchanged or is
set to zero.
Rsclear 15000 Refund given (added into refund counter) when the storage value is set to zero from
non-zero.
Rselfdestruct 24000 Refund given (added into refund counter) for self-destructing an account.
Gselfdestruct 5000 Amount of gas to pay for a SELFDESTRUCT operation.
Gcreate 32000 Paid for a CREATE operation.
Gcodedeposit 200 Paid per byte for a CREATE operation to succeed in placing code into state.
Gcall 700 Paid for a CALL operation.
Gcallvalue 9000 Paid for a non-zero value transfer as part of the CALL operation.
Gcallstipend 2300 A stipend for the called contract subtracted from Gcallvalue for a non-zero value transfer.
Gnewaccount 25000 Paid for a CALL or SELFDESTRUCT operation which creates an account.
Gexp 10 Partial payment for an EXP operation.
Gexpbyte 50 Partial payment when multiplied by rlog256(exponent)s for the EXP operation.
Gmemory 3 Paid for every additional word when expanding memory.
Gtxcreate 32000 Paid by all contract-creating transactions after the Homestead transition.
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Name Value Description*
Gtxdatazero 4 Paid for every zero byte of data or code for a transaction.
Gtxdatanonzero 68 Paid for every non-zero byte of data or code for a transaction.
Gtransaction 21000 Paid for every transaction.
Glog 375 Partial payment for a LOG operation.
Glogdata 8 Paid for each byte in a LOG operation’s data.
Glogtopic 375 Paid for each topic of a LOG operation.
Gsha3 30 Paid for each SHA3 operation.
Gsha3word 6 Paid for each word (rounded up) for input data to a SHA3 operation.
Gcopy 3 Partial payment for *COPY operations, multiplied by words copied, rounded up.
Gblockhash 20 Payment for BLOCKHASH operation.
Wzero = {STOP, RETURN}
Wlow = {MUL, DIV, SDIV, MOD, SMOD, SIGNEXTEND}
Wmid = {ADDMOD, MULMOD, JUMP}
Whigh = {JUMPI}
Wextcode = {EXTCODESIZE}
Wbase = {ADDRESS, ORIGIN, CALLER, CALLVALUE,
CALLDATASIZE, CODESIZE, GASPRICE, COINBASE TIMES-
TAMP, NUMBER, DIFFICULTY, GASLIMIT, POP, PC, MSIZE,
GAS}
Wverylow = {ADD, SUB, NOT, LT, GT, SLT, SGT, EQ,
ISZERO, AND, OR, XOR, BYTE, CALLDATALOAD, MLOAD,
MSTORE, MSTORE8, PUSH*, DUP*, SWAP*}
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review
This chapter is broken into two major sections:
• Internet Voting, which introduces Internet voting: procedures and concepts,
and offers a survey of significant Internet voting systems, projects, pilots, and
experiments.
• End-to-End Verifiability, which introduces the concept of end-to-end verifiable
(E2E-V) voting systems, reviews the functionalities required to support end-to-
end verifiability (technical and non-functional), the architectural options avail-
able, existing E2E-V systems, and common cryptographic techniques available
for use in such systems.
3.1 Internet Voting
Internet voting, sometimes referred to as remote electronic voting, is a system
of voting where voters are able to cast their votes over the Internet.
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Procedure The U.S. Vote Foundation describes the typical phases involved in
conducting an Internet based election as follows: [16]
1. Setup, during which election officials gather voter information, identify election
issues and races, design ballots, etc.
2. Distribution, during which election materials are distributed to voters: ballots,
credentials, voting instructions, etc.
3. Voting, during which voters mark their ballots.
4. Casting, where voters finalize and submit their ballots and election officials
receive said ballots.
5. Tallying, where election officials count votes, tabulate results, and announce
winners.
6. Auditing, where (as necessary) vote results are evaluated for incorrect results.
Requirements The requirements for an Internet-based voting system are the same
as those for any other voting system; it must be secure, correct, and private.
3.1.1 Survey of Internet Voting Systems
In September of 2011 the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) published
“A Survey of Internet Voting,” which offered a broad review of various Internet
voting systems used between the years of 2000 and 2011. [49] In total, the survey
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reviews 30 Internet voting systems used for elections and primaries, by various parties
and governments, at various levels of government: national, state, and local.
3.1.1.1 Voting Over the Internet (VOI) — 2000
In 1986, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UO-
CAVA) was passed to render services to merchant marines, uniformed services, and
other overseas civilians. Broadly, UOCAVA mandates that overseas and military
voters be able to remotely register and vote in federal elections, and designates the
Secretary of Defense as the executive agent responsible for implementing its provi-
sions. Thus, under the Department of Defense (DoD), the Federal Voting Assistance
Program (FVAP) was established to provide voter assistance, tools, and education
to overseas voters with the goal of enabling overseas voters to vote from anywhere
in the world. In pursuit of this goal, FVAP established procedures for delivering
election materials through domestic, military, and foreign postal systems.
In an effort to eliminate some of the weaknesses inherit in postal systems,
primarily transit times and unreliable delivery guarantees, FVAP established the
Voting Over the Internet (VOI) project.
“The pilot project was designed to examine the feasibility of using the
Internet for remote registration and voting in an effort to overcome the
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time and distance barriers faced by UOCAVA voters. ‘This was the first
time that binding votes were cast over the Internet for federal, state, and
local offices, including the President and Members of Congress.’” [49,22]
The VOI architecture consisted of 3 major components, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3.1:
• Citizen infrastructure: any workstation or personal computer with Internet
access that was available to the voter.
• FVAP infrastructure: VOI systems maintained by FVAP, namely the FVAP
server, which hosted the server-side VOI software, various intrusion detection
systems, networking infrastructure, and administrative workstations.
• Local Election Official (LEO) infrastructure: systems managed by LEOs, namely
servers running VOI software and workstations to interact with said software.
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Figure 3.1: VOI System Architecture [22]
Citizen Infrastructure FVAP mailed a CD-ROM to participants contain-
ing VOI software, this came in the form of a Netscape Navigator browser plug-in
which provided a graphical user interface to cast ballots and communicate with the
VOI server-side components.
FVAP Infrastructure The FVAP infrastructure consisted of the FVAP
server hosting the VOI software, various networking and power redundancy compo-
nents to support the server, two network intrusion detection systems, a server hosting
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software for creating electronic ballots, and an administrative workstation for inter-
acting with the FVAP server. The collective functionalities which this infrastructure
provided included voter authentication, ballot routing to LEO infrastructure, and
ballot creation.
Local Election Official Infrastructure Each LEO site managed a server
running VOI software which connected over the Internet with the FVAP-maintained
VOI server and a workstation which allowed LEOs to perform administrative oper-
ations with the server.
The VOI pilot successfully served 84 volunteers across 4 states. Administra-
tors did not detect any intrusions into the system during its operation. However, the
DoD acknowledged in their assessment report that one of the major shortcomings of
the pilot was its small sample size, and, that the incentive to attack such a system
would increase as the number of participants increased. [22] A future security panel
criticized the VOI system for taking the position that, “the citizen’s workstation is
outside the security perimeter of the system,” noting that it effectively ignores some
of the most serious kinds of attacks which the system is vulnerable to. [30] On the
topic of remote internet voting the DoD assessment report expressed the following:
“[remote internet voting] is subject to the same security concerns as the
current VOI System. For this reason, we cannot recommend this alter-
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native as an immediate follow-on development to the VOI Pilot. [22]”
3.1.1.2 Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE) — 2004
In 2002, following the VOI project, Congress instructed the DoD to carry
out a larger demonstration project, “under which absent uniformed services voters
are permitted to cast ballots in the regularly scheduled general election for Federal
office.” [47] To fulfill this mandate FVAP contracted Accenture to build The Secure
Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment (SERVE).
SERVE was built under the United States’ Department of Defense’s (DoD)
Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) to be deployed for the 2002 or 2004
elections. Broadly, the motivations behind SERVE were to produce an Internet-
based voting system to reduced barriers to voting for Americans living overseas;
specifically the objectives of the project were to:
1. “assess whether the use of electronic voting technology could improve the voting
participation success rate for UOCAVA citizens,” [23] and
2. “assess the potential impact on state and local election administration of an
automated alternative to the conventional by-mail process of absentee regis-
tration and voting.” [23]
Fifty counties covering 7 states were targeted for participation and the system
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was designed to handle both the registration and voting process.
Architecture SERVE shared many architectural-similarities to VOI which are re-
flected in the SERVE architecture diagram seen in Figure 3.2:
• SERVE was designed as a web-based service which a voter could connect to
via web browser.
• LEOs managed a local server which could be used to interact with the central
SERVE system.
• The central SERVE system, which performed the bulk of the system processing,
was maintained by FVAP and stored voter information until the appropriate
LEO server downloaded it.
The system was described as consisting of eight integrated subsystems: Iden-
tification and Authentication; Common Services; Voter Registration; Election Ad-
ministration; Ballot Definition; Voting; Download and Decryption; and Tabulation.
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Figure 3.2: SERVE System Architecture [49]
To participate one had to have a military ID (a Common Access Card), or
could enroll in the SERVE system by presenting face-to-face proof of citizenship to
a SERVE official. Once enrolled and registered, a participant could vote via a web
browser through the SERVE site. Figure 3.3 outlines the protocol used for casting a
ballot through the SERVE web application.
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Figure 3.3: SERVE Voting Protocol [49]
SERVE received harsh criticism from independent system reviewers, members
of the Security Peer Review Group (SPRG), academics and industry professionals
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who were assembled by FVAP to evaluate the system. A group of these members
independently publicized concerns regarding the security of the system and Internet-
based voting systems more broadly. [30]
The report published notes that SERVE suffers from a number of vulnerabil-
ities and goes into great detail regarding the risks these vulnerabilities pose and the
complexity of performing various attacks to take advantage of these vulnerabilities.
The report noted: [30]
1. Lack of voter-verified audit trails and vulnerabilities to insider attacks. Vul-
nerabilities in software are difficult to find and intentionally obfuscated vul-
nerabilities are even more so. The essentially unauditable nature of electronic
voting systems necessitate some form of voter-verified audit trail.
2. Privacy. Several system design issues were identified which would allow LEOs
or SERVE administrators to tie a ballot to a voter’s identity.
3. Vote Buying/Selling. The nature of Internet voting makes selling credentials
for voting systems a very real possibility.
4. Intimidation. Voter intimidation is a problem which all remote voting systems
must contend with, this problem extends to Internet voting systems.
5. Large-Scale Impact. Electronic voting machines, if compromised, might en-
able attackers to modify or damage tens or hundreds of thousands of ballots.
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Internet voting systems face this same issue, except on a much larger scale;
the entire system essentially acts as a single electronic voting machine, signifi-
cantly increasing the scale of impact if compromised. Paper-based systems do
not face these same exposures.
6. Too Many Potential Attacks. Electronic systems present a large attack surface,
exposure to the Internet presents even more. Mitigation of all of the kinds of
attacks possible would not be feasibility.
7. Many Sources of Attacks. Elections held over the Internet are vulnerable to at-
tacks from around the globe; nation-state entities, terrorists, individual hackers
and more would all have the ability to attack system.
8. Undetectable Attacks. Electronic systems make detecting attacks extremely
difficult and the lack of a detected attack on a system does not prove that no
attack occurred.
9. On-screen Electioneering. Many states prevent campaigning within some dis-
tance of a polling place; however, no such laws exist to prevent ISPs, web
browsers, or other entities from displaying ads to voters.
In addition the report had this to say about future attempts at building
Internet voting systems:
“Like the proponents of SERVE, we believe that there should be better
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support for voting for our military overseas. Still, we regret that we
are forced to conclude that the best course is not to field the SERVE
system at all. Because the danger of successful, large-scale attacks is
so great, we reluctantly recommend shutting down the development of
SERVE immediately and not attempting anything like it in the future
until both the Internet and the world’s home computer infrastructure
have been fundamentally redesigned, or some other unforeseen security
breakthroughs appear.” [30]
In response to these criticisms and concerns documented in this report, the
then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz decided that the SERVE project
would not go forward as planned for the 2004 election, effectively killing the project. [23]
Three years later the DoD published a report which downplayed the criticisms and
concerns published by the SPRG members. [23] In reaction to this DoD report, the
members of the SPRG independently publicized a response which criticized the re-
port for downplaying the concerns laid out in their initial security analysis of SERVE,
and further reiterated their concerns regarding Internet voting. The members of the
SPRG noted again that the issues faced by SERVE are ones which are not capable
of being fixed by a better design or architecture of Internet voting systems, because
the fundamental issues are ones which could only be fixed by redesigning both the
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Internet and personal computers. [29]
3.1.1.3 D.C. Digital Vote-by-Mail System (DVBM) — 2010
In 2009 the Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act (MOVE) was
passed. This act amended UOCAVA and other statutes to provide further protec-
tions to eligible citizens. Specifically the act aimed to reduce the number of ballots
which are not counted due to late receipt. MOVE accomplishes this by requiring that
states send absentee ballots no later that 45 days prior to election day. MOVE goes
further by requiring that all registration material and blank ballots be available elec-
tronically and removes requirements regarding notarization on voting applications
and ballots. [48]
In search of a solution to improve their compliance with the MOVE act,
Washington’s District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics (DCBOEE/BOEE)
planned to launch an Internet voting system, the D.C. Digital Vote-by-Mail (DVBM)
system, for use in the November 2010 general election. The project was developed
in partnership with the Open Source Digital Voting (OSDV) Foundation’s Trust-
TheVote project, who viewed the project as a mostly academic effort. [34] The sys-
tem was slated to be operational in time for the November 2010 general election and
aimed to provide two primary functionalities: [49,50]
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1. allow voters to electronically access voting materials
2. allow voters to optionally cast their ballot over the internet
The DVBM architecture, illustrated in Figure 3.4, was developed as a web
application using the Ruby on Rails framework; was hosted using the Apache web
server; used MySQL as its database technology, which stored the global election
state (voters’ names, addresses, etc.); and used the underlying (Linux) filesystem
to store encrypted ballots cast by voters. When the voting phase of the election
was complete, election officials would transfer the encrypted ballots to an air-gapped
computer for decryption and printing. Printed ballots would be counted alongside
other mail-in absentee ballots. [50]
Figure 3.4: DVBM System Architecture [50]
Prior to the official launch of the system the BOEE opted to conduct a mock
election where members of the public, researchers, and hackers alike were invited
to to test the functionality of the system, discover vulnerabilities, and attempt to
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compromise the security, reliability, and availability of the system. [49,50,34]
Within 48 hours of the system going live researchers from The University of
Michigan, playing the role of an attacker, demonstrated a number of vulnerabilities
and attacks on on the system and managed to gained near-complete control of the
election server. Their intrusion was not detected for nearly 2 days. [50]
Demonstrated vulnerabilities included being able to:
• penetrate the network of the election software
• determine voter’s identities
• locate unencrypted ballots, thus mapping voter’s identities to their personal
votes
• modify ballots
• cast fake ballots
• modify the election system software itself
Once election officials became aware of the attack, the mock election was
suspended, five days ahead of schedule, citing “usability issues.” Election officials
later confirmed that they were unable to detect the attack or network presence using
their intrusion detection system. Due to the test results, the portion of the system
which allowed for ballots to be submitted over the Internet was not used. [50]
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3.1.1.4 Estonia — 2005
Estonia began using Internet voting in 2005 [49]; in the 2015 Estonian par-
liamentary elections, 30.5% of all voters voted over the Internet. Estonia maintains
what is likely the most advanced national identification cards in the world. Estonian
IDs are part of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) where IDs serve as smart cards
which possess two RSA key pairs: one for signing and one for authentication; these
cryptographic functions are performed directly on the card. The signatures produced
by these IDs are used extensively throughout the country and are considered legally
binding. These cryptographic IDs allow Estonia to provide voter authentication ca-
pabilities that cannot be reproduced in the US. Despite the advanced authentication
capabilities that Estonia is able to achieve, researchers in 2014 devised a number
of attacks that could be performed on the Estonian voting system to spoil ballots,
damage ballot secrecy, and steal or drop votes. The researchers also criticized the
transparency and operational security of the system, noting that videos of the admin-
istration processes — provided for transparency purposes — recorded administrators
entering root passwords, revealed network credentials which had been posted on a
wall, and showed administrators using USB drives containing personal files to move
sensitive election materials between systems. [45]
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3.2 End-to-End Verifiability
The vulnerabilities and weaknesses of electronic voting systems demonstrate
a clear need for a stronger kind of system design. End-to-End Verifiable (E2E-V)
voting systems are systems which aim to provide such a design by providing the
following features for voters:
1. allows voters to check that the system recorded their votes correctly
2. allows voters to check that the system included their votes in the final tally
3. allows voters to count the recorded votes and double-check the announced
outcome of the election.
An End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting (E2E-VIV) is an E2E-V voting
system that supports voting over the Internet.
3.2.1 Requirements
In 2015, the U.S. Vote Foundation published a specification and feasibility
assessment study which laid out requirements for building an end-to-end verifiable
internet voting system. The study broke these requirements into two categories: [16]
• Technical Requirements, the set of requirements which can be directly ad-
dressed by system design and architecture
• Non-Functional Requirements, the set of requirements which must be imposed
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on a system by external entities
3.2.1.1 Technical Requirements
The ten categories of technical requirements, those which should be addressed











The functional requirements deal primarily with casting and recording of bal-
lots. Receipt freedom is one such functional requirement. An electoral system which
expresses receipt freedom is said to make it impossible for a voter to prove to anyone
how they voted. Others functional requirements include:
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• ensuring that a voter cast a ballot if such an act is recorded
• data retention in case of failure
• multi-vote functionality to overwrite previous votes
• maintaining voter anonymity
Usability is mostly concerned with user experience and confirmation guaran-
tees. For example, voters should be confident that their vote was cast by being pro-
vided a confirmation screen. The voting process should be both intuitive and guide
the voter through the process. Presentations such as the butterfly ballot should be
avoided at all costs.
Digital voting systems have the potential to provide wider accessibility guar-
antees than traditional paper ballots for voters with disabilities. To provide these
guarantees developers must involve voters throughout the development process to
identify accessibility issues and implement solutions.
Security is an integral property and requirement which voting systems must
maintain. Included in this requirement is that:
• no data can be permanently lost
• integrity of voters, candidates, ballot information, cast ballots, and other crit-
ical information must be maintained
• accurate timing information is critical for auditing
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• voting equipment must be protected
• the system must perform regular health checks
Authentication is the process of ascertaining the validity of a claimed identity.
Authentication ensures that the voting system can enforce privacy and prevent multi-
voting, Sybil attacks, and vote theft. All individuals must be identified uniquely. The
system must allow access to services only to authorized users, e.g., only allow election
officials to load ballot info.
The property of auditability means that a voting system is capable of com-
prehensive examination. Auditability must exist at all stages and levels of the voting
process. The system must keep auditable logs of all relevant activity and the logs
must be public and write only. Furthermore, the logs cannot leak any data regarding
voters or the way any ballot was cast. Privacy must always be the foremost concern.
The auditing system must actively report issues and information in real-time.
At least the following events should be recorded: [16]
• “all voting-related information, including the number of eligible voters and
votes cast, the number of invalid votes, count and recount results, etc.”
• “any detected attacks on the operation of the system or its communication
infrastructure”
• “any system failures, malfunctions, or other detected threats to proper system
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operation.”
The system should provide auditing features which support the ability to: [16]
• “cross-check and verify the correct operation of the voting system and the
accuracy of the election results”
• “detect voter fraud”
• “prove that all counted votes are legitimate and that all ballots have been
counted”
Finally, auditability must extend to the source code, actions performed, and the
documentation itself.
System operational requirements are those that enforce and regulate trans-
parency, accountability, system configuration, and updates. Logs, software, config-
urations, versions, updates, etc., must all be managed and produced to audit for
tampering. Protocols should be in place to guard sensitive equipment at all times
and handle system failures. Officials managing these systems and the procedures
themselves must be scrutinized closely to prevent insider attacks and election fraud.
Reliability is the property of a system behaving reasonably and as expected
under both normal conditions and while under attack. During an election period
a system should be highly available. 99.9% availability is a minimum for voting
systems. The system must also be able to recover from any failure within 10 minutes,
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with the exception for failure caused by natural disaster or malicious attack. The
system should have redundant backup systems for critical components of the system.
Internet voting systems are compelling targets for Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DDoS) attacks, therefore it is important that an E2E-VIV system be hardened
to such attacks and be able to continue operation with full correctness during a
sustained DDoS attack.
An E2E-VIV system must use open standards for interoperability between
components, services, and other E2E-VIV systems. Logs and documentation of such
standards must be published so that anyone can download, inspect, and publish
analysis and concerns.
Finally, there should be certification and test procedures involved for every
functional requirement; these tests should be able to be run on demand. Formal
proofs of security and correctness should be provided wherever possible, and third-
parties should be hired to conduct an independent review, audit, and test of the
system.
3.2.1.2 Non-functional Requirements
The five non-functional requirements defined, those which must be fulfilled







The specification describes several operational requirements: election and reg-
istration timing, maintaining voter registration and candidate nomination lists, pro-
viding receipt freedom, voter assistance, election integrity, and openness.
Voters must be well-informed on how to register, vote, and protect their
privacy in the voting system. Clear instruction on when voting and registration
occurs should be announced far in advance for the voter’s benefit. When multiple
forms of remote voting take place, votes cast over the Internet should not be accepted
after other forms of remote voting end. E2E-VIV systems must publish a voter
register that is regularly updated. Voters should be able to check that information
in the register is accurate and request corrections. The ballot presented to voters
must be consistent, fair, unbiased, and free from any superfluous information about
candidates/choices.
Operational receipt freedom represents two different requirements depending
on whether a voter is voting from a supervised or unsupervised location. In a super-
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vised location receipt freedom requires that the voting terminal clear all indication of
how a ballot was cast and ensure that no paper trail representing how the ballot was
cast is able to leave the polling place (except by official means). In an unsupervised
location any visual proof of vote should not be able to be used to determine how a
vote was cast or will be tallied.
If test ballots are capable of being submitted then those ballots must be clearly
marked as a test ballot with instruction on how to cast a real ballot. The voting
system should not disclose any results to any person until after the voting period
has ended, including alternative forms of voting. Tallying should be done as soon as
possible afterwards and the tallying process should be transparent, recorded, and be
able to be replayed. Any irregularities which affect the integrity of votes should be
recorded.
An E2E-VIV system must be open and function properly regardless of the
hardware or software being used to run the voting software. The system must be
available for auditing by external actors, especially when considering components
which are expected to be run on external systems or voter’s machines.
Procedural requirements define the processes required to deploy and run the
E2E-VIV system.
• Procedures should be published regarding provisioning, certification, mainte-
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nance, availability, and use. For example, when updates occur, election officials
must call upon an independent body to perform verifications of performance
and certification of intent.
• Procedures should be in place to teach voters the voting process.
• Election officials should have maintenance and security procedures to ensure
that voting equipment is operating nominally and has not been tampered with.
For example, conducting sensitive operations should require teams of at least
two people.
• As much as possible there should be procedures in place to allow observers to
watch election procedures.
• Procedures should be in place to update results in the event that a voter proves
that their vote was not accurately received or counted.
The legal requirements include national, state, and local laws that apply to
voting systems, e.g., accessibility, anonymity, and availability guarantees. Any de-
ployed E2E-VIV system must comply with these laws. For example, election officials
must ensure that only one ballot by each voter is tallied when multiple means of
voting exist, e.g., remote and traditional polling place.
“There must be no impediments to interested parties who want to study
the E2E-VIV system. In particular, no nondisclosure agreement or con-
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tract of any kind may be required for download and study of, or for build-
ing, testing and publishing test results for, the E2E-VIV system.” [16]
To meet assurance requirements, client-side software must be functional and
free of bugs across a wide range of hardware and software stack combinations. There
must be strong security with respect to authentication such that voter credentials
cannot be forged or invalidated without breaking underlying cryptographic protocols.
The entirety of the voting system — e.g., software, documentation, design,
architecture, algorithms, build scripts, issue tracking system, etc. — must be free,
open, and public. All available resources should be up to date, certified, and released
under license that permits anyone to download, build, test, or modify the source.
To meetmaintenance and evolvability requirements election officials must have
the right and ability to update the election system to conform to law, technology, or
threat independent of the original vendor.
3.2.2 Architecture
The study, “The Future of Voting: End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting,”
provides an architectural feature model, seen in Figure 3.5, which defines over 127,000
possible architectural variants. [16]
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Architectural Feature Model






7 ensure 0 < Result.count;
8 for_all v: VALUE such_that v member_of Result
9 it_holds v member_of { Centralized, Distributed };
10 end
11 crypto_protocols: SET[VALUE]
12 ensure 0 < Result.count;
13 for_all v: VALUE such_that v member_of Result
14 it_holds v member_of { On_Paper, Mechanized, Verified, Generated };
15 end
16 correctness_evidence: SET[VALUE]
17 ensure 0 < Result.count;
18 for_all v: VALUE such_that v member_of Result
19 it_holds v member_of { Process_Based, Assertions };
20 end
21 implementation_type: SET[VALUE]
22 ensure 0 < Result.count;
23 for_all v: VALUE such_that v member_of Result
24 it_holds v member_of { Golden_Implementation, Open_Protocols_and_Specs };
25 end
26 key_distribution_method: SET[VALUE]
27 ensure 0 < Result.count;
28 for_all v: VALUE such_that v member_of Result
29 it_holds v member_of { Public_Ceremony, Threshold_Cryptography, PKI, Web_of_Trust };
30 end
31 deployment_style: SET[VALUE]
32 ensure 0 < Result.count;
33 for_all v: VALUE such_that v member_of Result
34 it_holds v member_of { Trusted_Servers, Public_Cloud, Peer_to_Peer };
35 end
36 client_technology: SET[VALUE]
37 ensure 0 < Result.count;
38 for_all v: VALUE such_that v member_of Result





Figure 3.5: A specification of the possible variants for an E2E-VIV system. [16]
Most of the variability available when constructing an E2E-VIV system stems
from the cryptographic techniques and tools available to select from when designing
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the system.
3.2.2.1 Cryptographic Techniques and Tools
The cryptographic techniques and cryptosystems available for use in E2E-V
electoral systems are presented in this section; this is not a comprehensive list of
cryptographic techniques and tools available, but includes some of the most common
techniques and tools leveraged in E2E-VIV systems.
Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public-key cryptography, uses pairs
of keys to securely encrypt and decrypt messages. There are many different public-
key based cryptosystems available for use.
Homomorphic cryptographic schemes allow one to perform basic arithmetic
operations on ciphertexts without requiring decryption of the ciphertext. This prop-
erty has a number of uses in E2E-VIV systems; for example, an E2E-VIV system
might leverage this property to tally a collection of encrypted ballots without de-
crypting any individual’s ballots.
Additive homomorphic encryption schemes enable processing of ciphertexts
by way of addition. The Pallier and Benaloh cryptosystems both support additive
homomorphic encryption. [1]
Multiplicative homomorphic encryption schemes enable processing cipher-
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texts by way of multiplication. The ElGamal cryptosystem supports multiplicative
homomorphic encryption.
Most E2E-VIV systems depend on an append-only web/public bulletin board. [27]
The append-only public bulletin board is a publicly-visible secure location where elec-
tion operations and ballot data are submitted, logged, and made available to support
auditing requirements. [16,1,7,40,42,33] Blockchains fulfill most of the requirements
of an append-only public bulletin board.
Secret sharing and threshold schemes allow a collection of actors to cooperate
to produce “shares” of a secret; each participant is responsible for managing their
share of the secret and some threshold of shares must come together to recover the
complete secret or perform cryptographic operations. [32,11]
A zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) is a probabilistic method which allows one
party to prove knowledge of some secret without revealing any information about
the secret itself. A zero-knowledge proof satisfies the following properties: [16,25]
1. Completeness, an honest verifier will be convinced by an honest prover.
2. Soundness, an honest verifier will not be convinced by a dishonest prover.
3. Zero-knowledge, the verifier will not learn any information regarding the secret
itself.
A useful form of zero-knowledge proofs are non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
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— also known as NIZKs, zk-SNARKs, or zkSTARKs — which are zero-knowledge
proofs which require no interaction between the prover and verifier for the verifier to
be convinced of correctness. [1,7,33,42]
Mixnet schemes are used to provide anonymity. Mix networks are operated by
a set of trusted nodes, mix-servers, which consume messages — typically encrypted
ballot data in the case of E2E-VIV systems — from a set of network-participants
to produce a random permutation of the input messages. Each node performs a
“mix” operation on the incoming messages in such a way that the output cannot
be unscrambled and tied back to a network-participant except by the node itself
which is performing the mixing operation. Therefore, as long as any single mix-
server in the mix network is acting honestly, the anonymity of the participants will
be maintained. [42,33]
A decryption mixnet operates by encrypting a message in multiple layers
with each mix server’s public key. To decrypt the message, the message layers are
decrypted in the opposite order they were encrypted in by each node. Each node
forwards its decrypted results to the next node in the mix network. So long as a
single node does not reveal the source of the message then the message will become
untraceable (assuming no information is leaked by the message itself). [42]
A re-encryption mixnet works by leveraging the re-encryption properties of
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the underlying encryption scheme. Certain cryptosystems make it possible to change
a ciphertext without modifying the underlying message. In this way a set of nodes
can shuffle and re-encrypt a ciphertext then pass them to the next mixnet node to
repeat the process. So long as a single node does not reveal the shuffling process the
anonymity offered by the mixnet will be maintained. [42,7]
Blind signature schemes separate the voter authentication, authorization, and
signing components from the vote tallying, shuffling, and decryption components. A
voter will encrypt a ballot (blind it) then send it to a signing authority who will
blind-sign the encrypted ballot after it has verified that the voter is qualified to vote.
Once a voter has acquired a blind signed ballot they can strip their identifying data,
unblind the ballot, and submit the signed ballot through an anonymous channel.
The underlying cryptosystem makes it such that the blind signed ballot is equivalent
to a signed unblinded ballot. [16]
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Chapter 4 – Methods
This work designs, builds, and analyzes various electoral systems, electoral features,
and voter authentication models. Implementations are provided as smart contracts
which are used to determine their efficacy, feasibility, and usability as tools to aid in
on-chain decision-making processes.
It is undeniable that the underlying infrastructure and properties thereof,
which are intrinsic to blockchain technologies, present risks and weaknesses with
regard to voting; however, these properties also present unique opportunities to
explore non-traditional and novel approaches to governance models, mechanisms,
and electoral systems. This research aims to lean into the advantages of the intrinsic
properties made available by blockchain technologies, while attempting to minimize
the risks presented and weaknesses exposed which are derived alongside them.
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4.1 Requirements
Borrowing from the requirements introduced and defined by, “The Future
of Voting: End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting” [16] — which were outlined in
Chapter 3, Literature Review, and grouped into two major categories: technical and
non-functional — a set of requirements are identified and targeted for satisfaction.
These requirements provide a framework to analyze the results produced by this
research. Table 4.1 summarizes the requirements targeted for fulfillment.
























The requirements identified in “The Future of Voting: End-to-End Verifiable
Internet Voting” have rightfully demanding and difficult to meet criteria for fulfill-
ment; however, the expectations laid out for a system of the kind imagined in the
study are far beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, a subset of the techni-
cal and non-functional requirements are identified which are considered achievable,
relevant, and within the scope of this research. The requirements are individually as-
sessed and categorized based on whether their criteria for satisfaction are considered
feasible to fully, mostly, or partially satisfy. The remaining requirements are consid-
ered either outside of the scope of this research or not feasible to otherwise fulfill and
are therefore not targeted. Several requirements are identified which are considered
partially or mostly satisfied by virtue of intrinsic properties made available through
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the underlying blockchain technology.
4.1.1 Technical Requirements
The technical requirements are requirements which the study asserts should be
fulfilled through the design and architecture of the system. This research attempts
to fully satisfy the authentication and system operational requirements; considers
the accessibility and usability requirements beyond the scope of this research, and
therefore makes no effort to satisfy them; and targets partial satisfaction of the
remaining requirements. Requirements which are targeted to be partially satisfied
are reviewed in further detail.
Reliability and Security Requirements Reliability and security requirements
are considered mostly satisfiable due to the inherent properties made available by
Ethereum and its decentralized structure; however, there are some notable potential
attacks on the network which are worth considering; these are discussed in further
detail in Chapter 5, Results.
Auditability Requirements Ethereum inherently offers a tremendously detailed
log through its blockchain structure which provides a wide range of opportunities for
detailed auditing and validation. Furthermore, auditing and validation functionality
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are inherent features of the blockchain. However, the auditability which Ethereum
provides is not considered a privacy preserving feature and therefore falls short of
the criteria presented.
Functional Requirements A subset of the functional requirements are deemed
relevant to this research:
 Multi-vote functionality is targeted to be investigated and fully satisfied in all
electoral system implementations.
+ Ensuring that “a voter’s ballot, and the act of them casting a ballot, is recorded
and retained as expected;” is considered mostly fulfilled through intrinsic prop-
erties of the Ethereum blockchain. Where this property falls short is when a
voter casts a ballot, broadcasts a transaction to the network, which miners fail
to include in any blocks. This is discussed further in Chapter 5, Results.
− Maintaining voter anonymity is considered partially fulfilled through intrin-
sic properties of the Ethereum blockchain. While it is technically possible to
broadcast privacy-maintaining transactions, those which preserve anonymity
on the Ethereum network, it is likely beyond the capabilities of most voting
actors and would be difficult to guarantee in any meaningful way. Pseudo-
anonymity is a better profile of the kind of anonymity which Ethereum offers,
This is discussed further in Chapter 5, Results.
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4.1.2 Non-Functional Requirements
The non-functional requirements are those which the study asserts must be
fulfilled by entities external to the system itself. These requirements are regarded
as being mostly beyond the scope and context of this research, however, the exis-
tence of this document does itself at least partially satisfy some of the categories of
requirements, e.g., assurance, maintenance, and evolvability. Detailed documenta-
tion regarding design, architecture and implementation is provided in Appendix A,
Software Documentation.
4.2 Assumptions and Objectives
Given the nascent nature of blockchain technologies, it is difficult to imagine
the demands and needs of the organizations and communities which will come to exist
in these cyberspace environments; and therefore difficult to predict which governance
models and electoral systems would best support them. However, it seems likely
that the needs of these organizations will vary as dramatically by organization as
the organizations which have come to exist in meatspace environments. It therefore
follows that a wide range of kinds of electoral systems should exist which would
serve to support the various governance models and decision-making processes that
are likely to form over time. Given these assumptions, and in compliance with the
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aforementioned requirements, the objectives of this research are defined as follows:
1. This research aims to explore various electoral systems and features, using the
content reviewed in Section 2.1 as a basis for exploration.
(a) Provide a range of kinds of electoral contracts using Table 2.1 and Table 2.2
as the primary resource for electoral system and feature selection.
i. Support single-winner elections and provide plurality and majority elec-
toral system in fulfillment of that objective.
A. Implement first-past-the-post to fulfill the targeted single-winner
plurality electoral system, due mostly to the fact that it is extremely
simple, well-understood, and widely-adopted.
B. Implement range vote to fulfill the targeted single-winner majority
electoral system, due to its effectiveness and simplicity.
ii. Support multi-winner elections and provide an electoral system which
offers proportional representation; Single transferable vote is selected as
the electoral system implementation to fulfill both objectives due to its
wide-adoption, prevalence, and effectiveness as a PR system.
(b) Explore the design, implementation, and efficacy of various ballot types
across the various electoral systems selected.
2. This research aims to explore voter authentication, registration, and access control
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patterns for managing voter registration.
3. This research aims to explore delegative or liquid governance models.
4.3 Tooling
As mentioned in Section 2.2.2.1, Ethereum offers a code execution environ-
ment via the Ethereum Virtual Machine. The EVM is responsible for executing a set
of low-level instructions which can be used to update the state of the network. [51]
A number of higher-level languages exist that are capable of being compiled into
the low-level bytecode representation required by the EVM for execution; this re-
search uses the Solidity language. In order for the EVM to execute bytecode, it must
first exist on the Ethereum blockchain. Deployment of bytecode to the Ethereum
blockchain is performed by constructing, and submitting to the Ethereum network,
an account creation transaction which includes the EVM bytecode. The account
creation transaction instructs the EVM to create a new account and to store the in-
cluded bytecode within it. Upon receiving the account creation transaction the EVM
will execute a special CREATE instruction (see Table 2.6) which will eventually result
in the creation of an “internal account.” This internal account will contain the EVM
bytecode, submitted with the create account transaction, and is commonly referred
to as a “smart contract.” Once a smart contract exists on Ethereum blockchain, the
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bytecode stored within it can be executed by constructing and submitting another
transaction to the network; this time instructing the EVM to execute the bytecode
stored within the smart contract. Beyond the bytecode stored in them when created,
smart contracts also contain and maintain their own internal state on the network,
which they can use as storage.
4.3.1 Frameworks
Given the complex process involved in compiling and deploying smart con-
tracts to the Ethereum network, a framework is typically leveraged to simplify devel-
opment and manage the smart contract deployment life-cycle. This research lever-
aged two different software frameworks to aid in the development of smart contracts:
Embark and Truffle. Both of these frameworks aid in the compilation of Solidity
code, deployment of EVM bytecode, provisioning of test networks, and testing of
contract functionality.
4.3.1.1 Embark
Initially, smart contract implementations were built using the Embark frame-
work. The Embark framework is designed to aid in the construction and deployment
of Decentralized Applications (DApps); it supports functionality to provision test
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networks, build and deploy contract code, and execute tests against deployed smart
contracts. The Embark framework is capable of managing, and deploying contracts
to, various other Ethereum blockchains; e.g., the testnet, private net, and livenet.
The Embark framework supports several useful development features. For example,
Embark can be configured to detect changes to contract code during development,
then trigger a recompilation and redeployment of modified contract code to the ap-
propriate Ethereum networks.
To build Solidity code into EVM bytecode, the Embark framework lever-
ages solcjs, which offers JavaScript bindings for the Solidity compiler. For expe-
dited development and testing, Embark exposes the Ethereum JavaScript testrpc.
The testrpc simulates a fully functioning Ethereum client, features an API for pro-
grammatic interaction (a useful feature during test execution), and is capable of
transaction execution speeds that complete near-instantaneously (speeds which could
not be matched by a live Ethereum network). Embark simplifies interaction with
Ethereum contracts by generating contract-equivalent (promise-based) JavaScript
functions that can be called to execute contract code. JavaScript support is pro-
vided by wrapping the web3js library which implements the generic Ethereum JSON
RPC spec.
The Embark framework also boasts support for other tools useful for build-
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ing decentralized applications; decentralized storage support via IPFS, decentralized
messaging functionality via Whisper and Orbit, and a curses-like dashboard which
exposes logs, environment configuration, contract state, service availability, the sta-
tus of application components and dependencies, and features an interactive console
for executing commands and querying application state. A screenshot of the Embark
dashboard is shown in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The Embark dashboard and application state.
4.3.1.2 Truffle
Later smart contract development was completed using the Truffle framework.
When compared to the contract development features of the Embark Framework,
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the Truffle framework can be viewed as an almost feature-identical framework —
i.e., smart contract lifecycle management, testing functionality, JavaScript bindings,
and network management — however, unlike the Embark framework, the Truffle
framework offers essentially no features related to DApp development. The Truffle
framework’s more targeted focus with regards to smart contract development and
management produced a cleaner development experience during the pursuit of this
research, which is concerned strictly with smart contract design and implementation
and not DApp development. Furthermore, the Truffle framework supports executing
workflows and tests in TypeScript, and can be used in conjunction with TypeChain
to generate TypeScript types for use with the smart contract bindings generated
by Truffle. A screenshot displaying the execution of a contract test via the Truffle
framework can be seen in Figure 4.2.
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Figure 4.2: Testing an election contract using the Truffle framework.
4.4 Architecture and Design
The design of the system is approached in three phases: authorization, elec-
tion, and delegation. Each phase considers different components of the overall system
architecture and each component is responsible for managing a different set of re-






The authorization components are designed to provide access control: to build
and maintain a set of eligible voters, administrators, and whatever other roles might
be necessary to implement the electoral systems. Ultimately, the authorization com-
ponents are responsible for restricting access to sensitive contract function calls that
mutate the state of the contract, e.g., casting ballots and configuration elections.
The design must be flexible enough to facilitate the varying and evolving needs
of different organizations and communities but consistent enough to support them
all through a common interface. Concepts are borrowed from traditional operating
system access control schemes/models and authorization mechanisms which provide
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guidance for system design. The underlying authentication features are handled via
the asymmetric cryptography provided by the underlying blockchain infrastructure.
4.4.1.1 Access Control
Access control schemes exist to authorize access to data and resources; they
are responsible for managing and defining the relationships between permissions, op-
erations, objects, and subjects. Several access control model schemes were considered
in this phase; among them were: access control lists, discretionary access control,
mandatory access control, and role-based access control.
Discretionary Access Control Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a form of
access control where the owner of some resource/object can dictate the operations
and permissions that other subjects can take on the resource/object. Additionally,
the owner of the resource/object can pass ownership to some other subject. You can
see a form of this in POSIX file systems where ownership over files is granted and
transferred through commands like chown and chmod.
Access Control Lists An Access Control List (ACL) is a collection of subject,
resource, and permission relationships which can be understood as a matrix, where
each cell, indexed by subject and resource, reflects the permissions available for the
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subject to access resource.
Role-Based Access Control Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is a form of
access control where collections of permissions are assigned to roles; roles are then
assigned to users. In RBAC roles are hierarchical, thus roles can be inherited from
parent roles.
4.4.1.2 Design
The fundamental resources exposed by smart contracts are function calls,
thus the security implementation and access control model must revolve around
that. We define an interface, Authority , which defines the canCall function. Any
contract wishing to implement access control on functions can leverage a contract









hasPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
getPermissions(address, bytes4) : uint256
grantPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
removePermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool




















isAuthorized(address, bytes4) : bool
BasicACL








requiredPermissions : mapping(bytes4 => uint8)
setACL(BasicACL) : bool
addResourcePermission(bytes4, uint8) : bool
hasPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
getPermissions(address, bytes4) : uint256
grantPermissions(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool










canCall(address, bytes4) : bool
<<interface>>
Authority





isAuthorized(address, bytes4) : bool
Figure 4.3: Authorization dependency graph modeling.
We define the Authorization interface which offers mechanisms for interacting
with an Authority . This interface defines getAuthority , setAuthority , and most impor-
tantly, isAuthorized . A contract that realizes the Authorization interface is expected
to aggregate an Authority but does not necessarily need one externally; for exam-
ple, a contract that provides Authorization may also be its own Authority . Likewise,
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an Authority can provide its own Authorization . The Authority and Authorization
interfaces together form our access control primitives.
The Guard contract realizes the Authorization interface and provides the mod-
ifier functions auth and authorized . These can be applied to other functions to easily
restrict function-call access to accounts that the Authority has approved, e.g.,
 Guard Usage Example Listing 4.1
1 function sensitive () public auth returns (bool _success) {
2 // The `auth` modifier prevents this function from being
3 // called until the Authority has confirmed that the
4 // the message sender has the proper privileges.
5 return true;
6 }
This implementation conforms to a number of design principles: separation
of concerns, dependency inversion principle, open/closed principle, interface segrega-
tion, substitution principle, and single responsibility principle. Ultimately it provides
the flexibility and resiliency necessary to build out a wide variety of electoral systems.
Ownership Access control often starts before our Authority and Authorization re-
alizations. Most contracts offer a primitive form of access control through Ownership .
All contracts and most contract functions are open and public by design; thus, it
is important to lock down sensitive contract functions from deployment. A com-
mon pattern is to store the address of the creator of a contract as an owner in the
contract state and to use that address to restrict access to sensitive public-facing
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functions. More complicated ownership mechanisms can be built using this pattern
by leveraging contracts which delegate ownership to another contract which can then
define more complex access control and management mechanisms. To facilitate in
this and many other useful patterns we introduce a simple Ownership interface. The
Ownership interface defines functions getOwner and setOwner which get and set the
account address of a contract’s owners respectively.
To facilitate in restricting access of functions to a single account we also define
a contract RestrictTo that provides a modifier function restrictTo . The restrictTo
modifier can be applied to any other function and takes an account address argu-
ment; if the address of the account calling a restrictTo modified function does not
match the argument provided to restrictTo (often the owner), then the function will
immediately exit and revert any changes to the contract. Finally, we realize and
extend these two contracts to form the concrete Owned contract. This pattern is so
ubiquitous that most, if not all, concrete contracts in our governance ecosystem will
extend this contract.
Authority We need to provide access control beyond interfaces, standards, and
single account address restrictions. Our access control implementation leans towards
access control lists as a primitive that can be extended to provide other access control
mechanisms such as role-based access control. Alternatively, a contract can realize
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the Authority interface itself if ACLs are not a useful abstraction.
Access Control List We first define an ACL interface, AccessControlList ,
which defines basic ACL functionality: hasPermission , getPermissions , grantPermission ,
removePermission , and removeAllPermissions . The design supports assigning up to 256
unique permissions per contract signature.
Basic ACL Next we realize a concrete implementation of the AccessControlList
interface named BasicACL . BasicACL is primarily a database contract which creates
a mapping from account address to a mapping of functions (the first 4 bytes of
their signature) to an unsigned 256-bit integer that represents the permissions. This
implementation is similar to what can be found in POSIX compliant operating sys-
tems. In Java one might represent this access control model as HashMap<Account,
HashMap<Function,Permission>>.
Naturally BasicACL provides implementations for the functions defined by
AccessControlList : hasPermission , getPermissions , grantPermission , removePermission ,
and removeAllPermissions . These work using bitwise NOT, OR, and AND operations
to modify the 256-bit unsigned integer representing permissions for a particular (ac-
count, function) pair.
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ACL Authority We can easily build an ACLAuthority out of our BasicACL
using the adapter pattern and aggregation. We simply aggregate an instance of a
BasicACL and realize the Authority and AccessControlList interfaces. Finally, we lean
on the hasPermission function to implement our canCall function which presumably
forwards our request to a BasicACL instance and returns the result. This structure also
allows us to implement a composite pattern and aggregate many trusted authorities
into one.
Voter Registration Authority Our final step is to use a facade to hide
the more complex implementation details from outside contracts. We introduce
a VoterRegistrationAuthority which realizes the Registry and Authority interfaces.
The Registry interface provides some nice abstractions: register , unregister , and
isRegistered . We presume the contract aggregates some number of AccessControlList s
as a foundation for its Registry function implementations, but does not need to nec-
essarily. Finally, the canCall function leans on the Registry functions, specifically
isRegistered to grant access to functions.
The end result is a clean, public, and composable voter registration authority.
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4.4.2 Election Components
The election components are responsible for constructing and operating elec-
tion processes. These responsibilities include maintaining the integrity and security
of the election, handling votes, tallying ballots, and determining election winners.
The phases typically involved in conducting an Internet-based election, de-
scribed in Section 3.1, are: Setup, Distribution, Voting, Casting, Tallying, and Au-
diting. Responsibilities pertaining to voter registration, which are typically handled
in the Setup phase, are expected to be managed by Authorization components. The
Distribution phase, which mostly pertains to processes such as mailing election mate-
rials to voters, is considered outside the scope of this research and therefore ignored.
The Auditing phase, where election integrity and results are scrutinized, is assumed
to be handled and provided by the underlying features made available by Ethereum.
4.4.2.1 Design
Each electoral system implementation is unique, due mostly to the unique
requirements necessitated by their underlying tallying algorithms and ballot struc-
tures.
There are important electoral criteria worth considering when analyzing the
implementation feasibility of these electoral systems, namely, the ballot counting
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criteria: summability, polynomial time, and resolvable. These electoral criteria are
significant because they impact the gas costs associated with operating the electoral
system. Table 2.2 is a useful resource when considering these electoral criteria. Both
the first-past-the-post and range vote electoral systems are a 1st-order summable;
i.e., ballots can be tallied using a linear amount of space with respect to the number
of choices available without losing information required to complete the tallying
processes. Both also have polytime ballot counting implementations that are linear
in the number of candidates and voters. STV is not listed in the table; however, its
single-winner equivalent (IRV) is; which implies that STV has, at best, a tallying
complexity of O(n2) and a summability complexity of O(n!) with respect to the
number candidates.
Gas costs must be considered when implementing, deploying, and running
contract functions on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). If gas costs are too
high then it may become infeasible for an external account to afford to execute a
contract function, e.g., the network fees become too high to vote. Another concern to
consider is that the cost to execute a contract function may become too high to ever
complete in a single block, therefore never actually complete. The most expensive
operations, by no small margin, are operations involving storage. Therefore it is
important to minimize storage usage.
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Finite State Machine Several of the voting system designs use a phased approach
with timed transitions between election states: Configuration, Frozen, Vote, and
Tally. These phases can be modeled as a finite state machine where calls to various
functions trigger transitions to different stages. A modifier function can be used to
restrict access of functions to only be callable during their appropriate state. Most
of the transitions from state to state can be designed as timed transitions which
occur lazily, i.e., the check to confirm that it is time to transition from one state to
another occurs when a function is called. The rationale for this approach is due to
the fact that Ethereum offers no mechanism to trigger code execution from within
the blockchain itself ; therefore all function calls, even if called from another function
or even a function in a different contract, must ultimately have originated from a
transaction created by an externally owned account. The product of this timed
transition implementation implies that the state restriction modifier needs to occur
after the lazily evaluated timed transition modifier; i.e., first update the current state
if it should be, then validate if the function should executed. On the other hand,
if transitions are manually updated during a function’s execution then the opposite
behavior should occur; i.e., first validate if the function should be run, then update
the state as required.
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Configuration The Configuration phase, as implied by the name, exists
to provide election administrators an opportunity to configure the election contract:
choices, election start/end time, etc. After the configuration is complete the admin-
istrators can freeze the contract, preventing it from being modified further.
Frozen Transitioning to the Frozen phase could simply set a boolean frozen
to true and update the phase to Frozen. The boolean frozen should be checked at
the start of every administrative function’s execution and should cause the immedi-
ate cease of code execution if the value is true. This serves to prevent potentially
malicious election administrators from modifying an election contract after the vot-
ing process has started; it also serves to notify external contracts and users that the
election is configured and is ready or waiting to move into the Vote phase.
Vote The Vote phase is the phase during which various kinds of voting
can occur for a particular election contest. A vote function should be defined. For
flexibility, a vote (uint8[], uint8[]) function signature is considered which is capable
of being leveraged by most kinds of electoral systems and ballot structures. For
example, as a sparse vector, where both arrays are of equal length; values in the
first array act as a choice index and values from the second array act as a choice
value. This could be used to marginally reduce the size of transactions for many
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kinds electoral systems.
Tally The Tally phase is the final phase of the election process that takes
place after the end of the Voting phase. The exact tallying process will depend on
the electoral system itself.
First-Past-the-Post The process for a first-past-the-post election is as follows:
1. Configuration
(a) Election administrators add each contest choice:
addChoice(bytes32 _choice) .
(b) Election administrators set the voting start time:
setVoteStartTime(uint _voteStartTime) .
(c) Election administrators set the voting end time:
setVoteEndTime(uint _voteStartTime) .
(d) Election administrators freeze the electoral contract, preventing further
contract configuration mutations: freeze() .
2. Frozen
(a) All functions are disabled until start time is met.
3. Vote
(a) Authorized voters cast votes by calling the vote(uint8 _choice) function,
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where the value provided is the choice the voter supports. Votes are
immediately summed into the struct of the appropriate choice. This is
feasible because the first-past-the-post electoral system is summable in
linear time and with linear space consumption.
4. Tally
(a) When the voting end time is reached the election moves into the Tally
phase. At this point only the tally function can be called. The tally
function, in this case, will check the number of votes for each candidate
and set the winner to the choice that has received the most support. The
election administrator is expected to run this contract function but any
account can execute this function without any consequence to the result
of the contract.
Range Voting The process for a range vote is very similar to the process for
first-past-the-post. It is as follows:
1. Configuration
(a) Election administrators add each contest choice:
addChoice(bytes32 _choice) .
(b) Election administrators set the voting start time:
setVoteStartTime(uint _voteStartTime) .
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(c) Election administrators set the voting end time:
setVoteEndTime(uint _voteStartTime) .
(d) Election administrators set the max score (<=100) a choice can receive:
setMaxScore(uint8 _maxScore) .
(e) Election administrators freeze the electoral contract, preventing further
contract configuration mutations: freeze() .
2. Frozen
(a) All functions are disabled until start time is met.
3. Vote
(a) Authorized voters cast votes by calling the vote(uint8[] _choices, uint8[] _scores)
function. The parameters act as a sparse vector where the value provided
in _choice indicates the choice being scored and the corresponding value
provided in _scores indicates the score of the choice. Scores are immedi-
ately summed into the struct of of the appropriate choice and a voteCount
member is incremented. This is feasible because the range vote electoral
system is summable in linear time and with linear space consumption.
4. Tally
(a) When the voting end time is reached the election moves into the Tally
phase. At this point only the tally function can be called. The tally func-
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tion for this electoral system will, for each choice, multiply the summed
score by 10p where p is precision then divide the result by voteCount to
find an average score for the choice. The winner is set to the choice with
the highest average score. The score is multiplied by 10p because the
EVM does not have floating point functionality and a greater precision
makes ties less likely. The election administrator is expected to run this
contract function but any account can execute this function without any
consequence to the result of the contract.
4.4.3 Delegation Components
The delegation components offer mechanisms for the electorate to vest votes
to delegates who may vote on their behalf. A delegation hierarchy lends itself to
a graph representation. [24] Specifically a directed acyclic graph (DAG) forest-like
structure where pendant and isolated vertices represent voters and all other vertices
represent delegates. A sink vertex represents a delegate who has not delegated their
vote further. Directed edges represent delegations. The total weight of a voter,
their voting power, can be measured by recursively calculating the total number of
incoming edges for each vertex. We represent edges in the graph as follows:
110
 Delegation Structure Listing 4.2
1 struct Voter {
2 uint40 weight; // 5 bytes
3 address delegate; // 32 bytes
4 }
Each time a delegation occurs a depth first traversal should be performed to
ensure that no cycles are created by the delegation; doing so maintains the acyclic
invariant required of the graph to support voter delegation. A simple graph coloring
algorithm is considered, beginning with white vertices and coloring vertices black
as they are traversed; traversal starts from the vertex representing the voter who
is delegating their vote and ends at some sink vertex. If no cycle is detected the
algorithm should check to see if the voter has already delegated their vote; if so, it
should traverse down their current delegation path, decreasing the weight of each
vertex visited by the weight of the voter or delegate delegating their vote. Finally,
the algorithm should record the new delegate address and perform a final traver-
sal, following the same path originally traversed while performing cycle detection,
increasing the weight of each vertex visited along the way by the weight of the voter
or delegate delegating their vote. More briefly:
1. Confirm that there are no cycles within the new delegation chain.
2. Decrease the weight of the delegates in the old delegation chain.
3. Increase the weights of the delegates in the new delegation chain.
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A complete implementation of this algorithm is as follows:1
 Vote Delegation Listing 4.3
1 mapping (address => Voter) voters;
2
3 function delegateVote (address delegate) public auth returns (bool _success) {
4 // The `auth` modifier prevents this function from being
5 // called until the Authority has confirmed that the
6 // the message sender has the proper privileges.
7 Voter cursor;
8 uint40 weight = voters[msg.sender].weight;
9
10 mapping (address => bool) visited;
11 visited[msg.sender] = true;
12 visited[delegate] = true;
13
14 // Cycle Detection
15 cursor = voters[delegate];
16 while (cursor.delegate) {
17 address newDelegate = cursor.delegate;
18 if (visited[newDelegate]) return false;
19 cursor = voters[newDelegate];
20 visited[newDelegate] = true;
21 }
22
23 // Decrement weights of old delegate chain.
24 cursor = voters[msg.sender];
25 while (cursor.delegate) {
26 address newDelegate = cursor.delegate;
27 cursor = voters[newDelegate];
28 cursor.weight -= weight;
29 }
30
31 // Increment weights of new delegate chain.
32 cursor = voters[msg.sender];
33 cursor.delegate = delegate;
34 while (cursor.delegate) {
1Here we assume that every voter has their voting weight initialized to 1. This algorithm might
be improved by combining the cycle detection and weight accumulation steps while leveraging the
revert() function to revert the state of the contract if a cycle is detected. We opt not to do that
for now because return values are not currently available with the revert() functionality.
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35 address newDelegate = cursor.delegate;
36 cursor = voters[newDelegate];






Chapter 5 – Results
This chapter outlines the results of this research. This chapter is divided into two
major sections:
1. Test Results, which reviews significant benchmarks, test results, and opera-
tional costs discovered in the design and implementation of this research.
2. Analysis, which uses the requirements and criteria, targeted in Section 4.1, and
objectives targeted in Section 4.2, to measure the shortcoming and results of
this research and also reviews insights and unexpected challenges encountered
during the implementation phase.
5.1 Test Results
Testing Ethereum contracts can be approached in several ways, but the choices
one can make with regards to testing mostly align themselves into one of two cat-
egories: the driver which is executing the contract being tested and the network
environment the contract is being tested within.
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1. The test driver generally comes in one of two shapes:
(a) Contract-to-contract unit tests, which use tests written as smart contracts
to drive contract execution. These tests provide confidence that inter-
contract communication will function as expected.
(b) Client-to-contract unit tests, which use transactions generated by external
accounts to drive contract execution. These tests provide confidence that
external accounts can run contract code as expected.
2. The network environment comes in several shapes, listed from least realistic to
most:
(a) The testrpc, now deprecated, is a Node.js-based Ethereum client which
simulates a full client and network behavior. It is free to execute and fast,
but lacks the complexities of a real node.
(b) Ganache, which replaces testrpc and is functionally identical from a test-
ing perspective.
(c) One can run a local instance of Ethereum. This is is free and accurately
represents an Ethereum node, but lacks real-world network complexities.
(d) There are several “testnets,” which are test networks designed for actual
contract deployments. Testnets provide a close-to-reality network envi-
ronment while still providing a free means of acquiring funds for testing.
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(e) The most accurate environment to test in is the actual Ethereum net-
work; this is not free, but offers a perfect real-world environment to test
contracts in.
The tests built in this research leverage the testrpc and Ganache as develop-
ment and testing environments, generally launched as either ganache-cli --accounts
100 --networkId 7357 or testrpc --gasLimit 0xffffffff --port 8546. Tests were driven
through JavaScript and TypeScript contract bindings using the Embark and Truffle
frameworks respectively.
5.1.1 Election Components
Several election contracts were implemented with various modifications to
their implementations based on their underlying electoral system and features be-
ing targeted. Each election contract accepts a configuration object containing the
choices available for the election along with various other properties based on the
requirements of the underlying electoral system. Additional details regarding imple-
mentation are available in Appendix A.
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5.1.1.1 Election Simulation
To generate estimates regarding the cost of execution and storage required
to support features of electoral systems, several sets of elections were simulated
using various configurations of contract implementation, choice availability, ballot
structure, and voter selection. The general process required producing minimal im-
plementations of each electoral system and modifying them as necessary to explore
the advantages and disadvantages of various design choices. Each electoral system
implementation then had minimal tests written to validate that basic functionality
was present, then simulations implemented. Each simulation leveraged hundreds of
accounts which were generated for our test network using Ganache. Each account,
to the extent supported by the underlying electoral system, made random voting
choices: selecting and scoring candidates through pseudorandom number generation.
Table 5.1: Simulated gas consumption by contract function.
Contract Operation Gas Consumption
Function Call Voters Total Average
UniCastFptp vote 1 100 8,007,700 80,077
UniCastRangeVote vote 1 100 17,417,564 174,175
MultiCastFptp vote 1 100 7,447,632 74,476
MultiCastFptp vote 2 100 3,208,496 32,084
MultiCastRangeVote vote 1 100 23,266,645 232,666
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Table 5.1: Simulated gas consumption by contract function.
Contract Operation Gas Consumption
Function Call Voters Total Average
MultiCastRangeVote vote 2 100 9,525,039 95,250
UniCastFptp tally 1 1 0 0
UniCastRangeVote tally 1 1 149,356 149,356
MultiCastFptp tally 1 1 917,790 917,790
MultiCastRangeVote tally 1 1 5,342,859 5,342,859
UniCastFptp computeResults 1 1 360,516 360,516
UniCastRangeVote computeResults 1 1 47,416 47,416
MultiCastFptp computeResults 1 1 47,438 47,438
MultiCastRangeVote computeResults 1 1 47,394 47,394
Table 5.1 documents the result of contract simulations, mapping gas con-
sumption by election contract function. These values were generated by measuring
the total gas consumption observed over several simulation runs and computing the
average cost per contract function. Simulations were configured using 100 voters in
each run, with 10 available choices to select from in each election. A random choice
selection and evaluation process was used to generate ballots used to vote. The tally
and results of each election were validated independently alongside the contract’s
results.
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Ballot Storage and Tallying Algorithms Section 2.1 introduced concepts re-
garding ballot structure and tallying algorithm. Section 2.1.2 further-refined these
ideas while introducing the ballot counting criteria: polytime, resolvable, and summa-
bility. To measure the significance of these criteria and the impact of various ballot
formats on our overall design, several implementations of FPTP and range vote were
implemented and simulated.
1. UniCastFptp is an implementation of first-past-the-post which was designed to
permit a single ballot to be cast per voter. This implementation takes advan-
tage of the summability criterion to avoid storing each individual voter’s ballot
and instead maintains a continuous tally of the ballots. The space required is
therefore constant with respect to the number of voters and linear with respect
to the number of candidates whose vote_counts are being tallied.
2. UniCastRangeVote , like UniCastFptp, is an implementation of range vote designed
to only allow a single ballot to be cast per voter. This implementation again
takes advantage of the summability criterion to avoid storing each individual
voter’s ballot and instead maintains a continuous tally of the ballots. The
range vote implementation needs to store slightly more information to support
its tallying algorithm, but shares the same storage complexity as the UniCastFptp
implementation.
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The UniCastFptp implementation demonstrated a very consistent gas consump-
tion across its function calls through the exercised simulations. The UniCastRangeVote
implementation maintained a slightly less consistent gas consumption across function
calls, but stayed respectably stable.
Multi-Vote Functionality and Tallying Algorithms The functional
requirements laid out in Section 4.1 and Table 4.1 demand multi-vote support. Two
contracts were written to demonstrate this functionality.
1. MultiCastFptp , an implementation of first-past-the-post designed to permit a
voter to cast multiple ballots.
2. MultiUniCastRangeVote , like MultiCastFptp, is an implementation of range vote
designed to allow multiple ballots to be cast per voter.
It is clear that a voter’s ability to cast multiple ballots in an election could only
be considered fair if the principle of “one person, one vote” were adhered to. That is
to say, any ballot which has been submitted and had some partial tally applied based
on its marks must have its computations undone before a newer ballot’s marks can
be considered for tallying. The ability to cast multiple ballots therefore carries with
it an implied requirement of vote reversal. In order to reverse a previous ballot’s
impact on a tally, knowledge of the ballot’s marks is required. Therefore, the most
recent ballot of each voter must be maintained in the contract’s state to support
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vote-reversal in the incident that they cast multiple ballots.
This draws into question the viability and utility of leveraging the summability
criterion as a storage-saving feature, as was leveraged in the previous contracts, and
introduces questions with regard to the eager evaluation vs lazy evaluation of tallying
algorithms. The unicast implementation of each electoral system took advantage of
eager evaluation, which essentially forced each voter to pay a nominal amount of
extra gas to keep the current tally of each choice maintained, this is reflected in
Table 5.1 by the low gas cost associated with the unicast tally functions (0 in the
case of contract UniCastFptp !). The more traditional approach to tabulating results
in an election is to defer the tallying procedure until the end of the voting period and
have an election administrator incur the cost and responsibility of tallying ballots.
This was the approach taken in the multicast implementations of these two contracts;
however, it is worth noting that a middle-ground exists which would increase the cost
to vote by a nominal amount and result in a less-expensive tally cost.
One interesting outcome regarding ballot storage and storage costs is reflected
in Table 5.1; there is a dramatic reduction in gas costs incurred when casting a second
ballot. The high initial gas cost reflects the high charge incurred for consuming
storage space on the blockchain. The lower cost reflected by the second call is a
product of the new ballot replacing the old ballot in storage, therefore consuming no
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additional space on the blockchain.
Precision Decision and Casting Fake Ballots Each electoral system has ad-
vantages and disadvantages. It is the responsibility of those selecting and designing
such systems to attempt to balance those advantages and disadvantages in a reason-
able way. Two examples of this encountered during this research can be seen in the
range vote implementations. The range vote implementation requires the following
configuration to be provided during contract construction:
 RangeVoteConfiguration Listing 5.1












The tally_precision value is worth addressing. The tallying algorithm used
to determine the rank of a choice in a range vote election is computed by taking the
summation of all of the scores cast for the choice and dividing that summation by the
number of voters who ranked the choice. This produces a score average which is used
to determine the winner of an election. One weakness of the EVM is that floating
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point operations are not supported; in order to address that a tally precision is used,
which multiplies the score_sum by 10tally_precision before dividing it to maintain some
degree of precision. What an appropriate value to assign to tally_precision is will
depend on the specifics of the election.
Another value worth addressing is the struct fake_ballots property. One
weakness of the range vote electoral system is that naive implementations can result
in elections where unknown alternatives, being neither voted for or against, win elec-
tions again more popular alternatives; imagine voting for oneself in a large election,
and being the only person to, therefore winning the election with a perfect score
average. One common technique to avoid this kind of result in range vote imple-
mentations is for election administrators to agree ahead of time to some number of
fake ballots to be cast. These fake ballots will score each choice with the same rank,
typically 0, and therefore bias results towards choices which have received enough
votes to overcome the low scores received from the fake ballots.
Modeling Finite-State Machine Transitions Election contract’s state transi-
tions were tested by creating and conducting mock elections to ensure that the results
are as expected. Passage of time in the testrpc is simulated using the evm_increaseTime
RPC method. [19]
• First-Past-the-Post The tests for the First-Past-the-Post electoral system
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are as follows:
1. Generate a First-Past-the-Post instance.
2. Test that the owner and creation time are properly initialized.
3. Confirm that the phase is Configuration .
4. Add two choices to be voted for.
5. Set the voting start time.
6. Set the voting end time.
7. freeze the contract so that no further configuration can occur.
8. Confirm that the contract is Frozen .
9. Increase the time of the EVM such that the contract’s timedTransitions
will trigger and move the contract into the Vote phase on the first ballot
submission.
10. Generate a set of Ethereum accounts and vote for the choices.
11. Monitor the cast ballots to confirm that the votes are submitted as ex-
pected.
12. Confirm that the phase is Vote .
13. Increase the time of the EVM such that the contract’s timedTransitions
will trigger and move the contract into the Tally phase.
14. Loop over the choices to find the winner.
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15. Confirm that the winner is the expected winner.
16. Confirm that the phase is Tally
• Range Vote The tests for the Range Vote electoral system are as follows:
1. Generate a Range Vote instance.
2. Test that the owner and creation time are properly initialized.
3. Confirm that the phase is Configuration .
4. Add three choices to be voted for.
5. Set the voting start time.
6. Set the voting end time.
7. freeze the contract so that no further configuration can occur.
8. Confirm that the contract is Frozen .
9. Increase the time of the EVM such that the contract’s timedTransitions
will trigger and move the contract into the Vote phase on the first ballot
submission.
10. Generate a set of Ethereum accounts and vote for the choices.
11. Monitor the cast ballots to confirm that the votes are submitted as ex-
pected.
12. Confirm that the phase is Vote .
13. Increase the time of the EVM such that the contract’s timedTransitions
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will trigger and move the contract into the Tally phase.
14. Loop over the choices to find the winner.
15. Confirm that the winner is the expected winner.
16. Confirm that the phase is Tally
5.1.2 Authorization Components
There are a number of contracts that need testing that revolve around autho-
rization, the most important being the VoterRegistrationAuthority , Guard , ACLAuthority ,
and BasicACL .
Voter Registration Authority The tests for the VoterRegistrationAuthority are
as follows:
1. Generate a set of external voting accounts.
2. Deploy an instance of the VoterRegistrationAuthority .
3. Register a subset of the voting accounts with the VoterRegistrationAuthority .
4. Verify that the registered voting accounts return true when passed to isRegistered .
5. Verify that the unregistered voting accounts return false when passed to isRegistered .
6. Unregister a subset of the registered voting accounts.
7. Verify that the registered voting accounts return true when passed to isRegistered .
8. Verify that the unregistered voting accounts return false when passed to isRegistered .
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Guard The Guard is tested using the previously deployed VoterRegistrationAuthority
as an Authority . A TestGuard instance is tested by attaching an auth modifier to a
dummy vote function. The vote function is then tested by confirming that each of
the verified voting accounts can call the vote function. Each unregistered account
is also tested to confirm that none of those accounts can call the vote function.
5.2 Analysis
Section 4.1 introduced a set of requirements to judge the results of this work
and Section 4.2 introduced a set of objectives this research targeted for completion.
This section reviews those sections in the context of test results produced for this
work.
5.2.1 Requirements
Table 5.2 highlights these requirements targeted from Section 4.1 and pro-
vides an overview of what was and was not fulfilled.
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The technical requirements are ones which are meant to be fulfilled through
the design and architecture of the system. The system operational requirements are
considered fulfilled here. The functional and audibility requirements were fulfilled as
expected. The accessibility and usability requirements were not targeted.
Certification The certification requirements assert that proofs of correctness are
necessary, which this research falls short of, but the tests and documentation available
do fulfill other certification requirements listed.
Authentication This research deeply explored authentication models and tech-
niques for managing access control for use in constructing voter registries. Much of
this research focused on building systems which would be reusable and composable
across many election and non-election systems; however, the result of these access
control models produced a security interface that, although working, is difficult to
interact with in a reasonable way. Inter-contract communication is difficult and man-
aging locks and mutexes across them is even more-so. Managing a security interface
which is entirely or mostly internal to a single contract is likely a much safer ap-
proach to consider in most cases, although probably also a less flexible model in the
long-term. However, a majority of the most important authentication functionalities
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required are provided through the underlying blockchain infrastructure.
Reliability Requirements The underlying resiliency of the Ethereum network
provides strong reliability guarantees; however, the network is not without its issues
and has seen attacks on it over time. More recently the network has faced serious
scaling issues which have driven gas prices up and made smart contract operation
an expensive endeavour.
Security Requirements This work, by virtue of building on an Internet-based
network, is accepting risks which make any consideration or application of its results
inappropriate for use in large-scale high-risk elections. Specifically, the intrinsically
electronic and remote properties, which are inherent in all publicly-available “off-
the-shelf” blockchain technologies, present so large an attack surface for would-be
attackers that it becomes an untenable foundation for any voting systems being
considered for use in elections where a high-risk threat model is maintained. Cor-
rectness, security, integrity, verifiability, and efficacy are the primary concerns of the
systems designed and considered in this research; however, it is worth noting that
the privacy constraints offered by traditional voting systems are severely loosened
within the scope of this research: no notion of receipt-freedom is assumed and pri-
vacy is only guaranteed insofar as the pseudo-anonymity provided by the Ethereum
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blockchain is maintained.
It is feasible that blockchain technologies could demonstrate utility in large-
scale voting systems if incorporated using well-established and known-safe patterns:
e.g., voter verifiable paper audit trails, private networks, requiring transactions be
signed by authorized sources, using voting machines which have been certified by a
federal commission, which are being hosted in traditional polling locations, and are
leveraging the appropriate cryptographic techniques to ensure privacy; e.g., homo-
morphic encryption, blind signing, and mix networks.
5.2.1.2 Non-Functional Requirements
The non-functional requirements as described in Section 4.1 are only fulfilled
insofar as this document and source code exists. Strong efforts were not otherwise
made to fulfill these requirements.
5.2.2 Objectives
Section 4.2 introduced a set of objectives this research targeted for completion.
This research succeeded in exploring electoral system design and implementation and
produced several contracts demonstrating single-winner electoral systems. However,
this failed to implement a multi-winner electoral system supporting proportional
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representation. STV is often described as a complex to implement electoral system
with difficult to handle edge-cases. The finite storage and computational resources
made available by the EVM make it a poor candidate for exploration. There are
other proportional representation systems with much lower storage and execution
complexities which are probably better candidates for resource-constrained environ-
ments like smart contracts.
This research thoroughly explored and designed many voter authentication,
registration, and access control patterns for voter registration. However, as previ-
ously stated, inter-contract communication is difficult to manage, especially when
multiple contracts might be deferring responsibility to a single contract managing
state. This issue, combined with the resource constraints of smart contracts, is ul-
timately what made further research into delegative or liquid governance models
infeasible. There are too many inter-contract communication issues to manage when
attempting to compute delegations across contracts and there does not appear to be
any clear way of designing smart contract dependencies in a way which enabled them
to be open to state changes while still providing consistent values during sensitive
contract execution procedures like ballot tabulation or delegation analysis.
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion
The issues faced by governments and societies — especially while wrestling with
issues such as the COVID-19 pandemic, state-sponsored election interference, and
claims of election fraud — demonstrate a clear need for improvements with regards
to electoral systems, voting systems, and governance models. The concept of de-
centralized organizations, democratically operating and existing on-chain, offers a
provocative and alluring alternative approach which might have the potential to
support more egalitarian and meritocratic social structures and governance models.
Section 2.1 introduced elections, electoral systems, and the tools available for ana-
lyzing them. Section 2.2 introduced blockchain technologies, their design, and the
properties thereof which might prove useful in a number of systems, such as voting,
where a high degree of verifiability and confidence of correctness is required.
The literature reviewed in Section 3.1 demonstrates the difficulty of building
Internet-based voting systems, and reviews a number of theoretical and real-world
attacks that have been demonstrated in the various attempts to build such systems.
As seen in Section 3.2, the tensions present in the security, privacy, and authenti-
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cation requirements of voting systems are challenging to resolve; however, although
still not without risks, there is promise in Internet voting if systems can be designed
which achieve end-to-end verifiability.
Section 4.4 explored several election, authorization, and delegation designs for
use on the Ethereum blockchain. However, although Chapter 5 demonstrated the
possibility implementing such systems, the issues outlined in Section 5.2 make clear
that the Ethereum blockchain still requires many improvements before it could be
considered capable of supporting the kind of next-generation elections and electoral
systems this research sought to investigate.
Among other things, the semantics available for building such systems are
complex and unintuitive, an inevitable source of bugs. Further, tools and techniques,
which are currently unavailable, are necessary to support large-scale systems such
as voting; for example, inter-contract communication and inter-block computations
should be possible with consistent states available across contract boundaries from
start to end of computation.
More importantly, the computation and storage requirements demanded for
electoral system operation is too high to make their use on-chain practical in most
scenarios. Measuring generously, the least expensive vote operation listed in Table 5.1
would cost the equivalent of $7.87, the average of these vote operations (across elec-
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toral systems implementations) measures in at $28.18 per vote, and in the worst
case a single vote operation might cost upwards of $57.11. The cost of executing
the most-expensive tallying operation is significantly worse, costing the equivalent
of over $1,300.00 to tally the ballots of an election simulation with just 100 voters.1
These prices are clearly far too high for serious consideration, and at best they ex-
clude from consideration a large number of popular electoral systems which have
much higher computation and storage demands than the ones selected.
These costs appear even worse when viewed in light of the fact that the mea-
surements made in Table 5.1 were the product of electoral system implementations
which were specifically designed to accurately measure the raw costs of the electoral
systems’ computational and storage requirements, and therefore included no security
or state management systems beyond that. Inclusion of such systems which would
certainly have made these operations more costly. Still, these results should not be
viewed in vacuum; some estimates put the cost of election administration in the US
at around $8.00 per voter, so the lower bounds of these results suggest that there is
potential here, especially with advancements to the Ethereum network and if some
scaling issues can be resolved.
1The gas price at the time of writing is approximately 120 gwei.
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Summary of Accomplishments
• Designed authorization components for managing voter registration and pro-
viding access control in a generalized way.
• Implemented election contracts, tests, and simulations to benchmark and an-
alyze electoral system performance and cost.
• Identified electoral system criteria relevant to Ethereum-based implementations
of electoral systems.
• Identified techniques for improving some performance characteristics of elec-
toral systems.
• Identified features which damage performance characteristics of electoral sys-
tems.
Future Work
• Unless scaling issues are resolved, it is likely that more reasonable approaches to
on-chain electoral system design would involve using dedicated or permissioned
blockchain implementations and leveraging the more traditional approaches to
E2E-VIV security as outlined in Section 3.2 and Section 5.2.
• If scaling issues are resolved then the following items seem like worthwhile areas
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of research:
– A set of hardened electoral system contracts and libraries.
– Electoral system contracts which provide support for multi-winner elec-
tions and support proportional representation.
– A standardized election interface. This seems difficult to produce given
the unique inputs and outputs required for different kinds of elections.
– An visual interface for marking and casting ballots to election contracts.
– Approaches and semantics for achieving consistency with inter-contract
computation, especially with regards to inter-block computation.
137
Bibliography
[1] Ben Adida. 2008. Helios: web-based open-audit voting. In USENIX security
symposium. Volume 17, 335–348.
[2] A.M. Antonopoulos. 2014. Mastering Bitcoin: Unlocking Digital Cryptocurren-
cies. O’Reilly Media. isbn: 9781491902646. https://books.google.com/books?
id=IXmrBQAAQBAJ.
[3] A.M. Antonopoulos and G.W.P. D. 2018. Mastering Ethereum: Building Smart
Contracts and DApps. O’Reilly Media. isbn: 9781491971918. https://books.
google.com/books?id=nJJ5DwAAQBAJ.
[4] Adam Back. 2002. Hashcash - A Denial of Service Counter-Measure. Technical
report.
[5] John J. Bartholdi and James B. Orlin. 1991. Single transferable vote resists
strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 8, 4, (October 1991), 341–354.
issn: 0176-1714, 1432-217X. doi: 10.1007/BF00183045. http://link.springer.
com/10.1007/BF00183045.
138
[6] Nadja Betzler, Arkadii Slinko, and Johannes Uhlmann. 2013. On the compu-
tation of fully proportional representation. Journal of Artificial Intelligence
Research, 47, 475–519.
[7] Dan Boneh and Philippe Golle. 2002. Almost entirely correct mixing with
applications to voting. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security, 68–77.
[8] Vitalik Buterin. 2013. Dagger: A Memory-Hard to Compute, Memory-Easy to
Verify Scrypt Alternative. Technical report. http://www.hashcash.org/papers/
dagger.html.
[9] Vitalik Buterin et al. 2014. A Next-Generation Smart Contract and Decentral-
ized Application Platform. Technical report 37.
[10] Vitalik Buterin. 2014. Dagger Hashimoto. eth.wiki. https://eth.wiki/concepts/
dagger-hashimoto.
[11] John Canny and Stephen Sorkin. 2004. Practical large-scale distributed key
generation. In International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 138–152.
[12] Jimmy Carter, Gerald R. Ford, Lloyd N. Cutler, Robert H. Michel, and Philip
Zelikow. 2002. To Assure Pride and Confidence in the Electoral Process: Re-
139
port of the National Commission on Federal Election Reform. Brookings Insti-
tution Press. isbn: 9780815706311. http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.
ctv80cdn3.
[13] Nikos Chondros, Bingsheng Zhang, Thomas Zacharias, Panos Diamantopoulos,
Stathis Maneas, Christos Patsonakis, Alex Delis, Aggelos Kiayias, and Mema
Roussopoulos. 2016. D-DEMOS: a distributed, end-to-end verifiable, internet
voting system. In 2016 IEEE 36th International Conference on Distributed
Computing Systems (ICDCS). IEEE, 711–720.
[14] Thaddeus Dryja. 2009. Hashimoto: I/O Bound Proof-of-Work. Technical re-
port.
[15] Quinn DuPont. 2017. Experiments in algorithmic governance: a history and
ethnography of “the DAO,” a failed decentralized autonomous organization.
Bitcoin and beyond, 157–177.
[16] Susan Dzieduszycka-Suinat, Judy Murray, Joseph R Kiniry, Daniel M Zim-
merman, Daniel Wagner, Philip Robinson, Adam Foltzer, and Shpatar Morina.
2015. The Future of Voting: End-to-End Verifiable Internet Voting. Specifica-




[17] Ethereum Foundation. 2018. Ethereum. ethereum.org. https://ethereum.org.
[18] Ethereum Foundation. 2021. Ethereum accounts. ethereum.org. https://ethereum.
org/en/developers/docs/accounts/.
[19] ethereumjs. 2017. ethereumjs-testrpc. npm package documentation. (2017).
https://www.npmjs.com/package/ethereumjs-testrpc.
[20] FairVote.org. 2021. Single winner voting method comparison chart. FairVote.
https://www.fairvote.org/alternatives.
[21] FairVote.org. 2021. Single winner voting method comparison chart (archived).
FairVote. https://archive3.fairvote.org/reforms/instant- runoff-voting/irv-
and- the - status - quo/ irv - versus - alternative - reforms/single -winner - voting-
method-comparison-chart/.
[22] Federal Voting Assistance Program. 2001. Voting Over the Internet Pilot Project
Assessment Report. Technical report. Department of Defense Washington Head-
quarters Services, (June 1, 2001), 93. https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/
Reports/voi.pdf.
[23] Federal Voting Assistance Program. 2007. Expanding the Use of Electronic




[24] Bryan Alexander Ford. 2002. Delegative Democracy. Technical report.
[25] Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson. 1991. Proofs that yield
nothing but their validity or all languages in np have zero-knowledge proof
systems. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 38, 3, 690–728.
[26] Andrew Gumbel. 2005. Steal This Vote. Nation Books, (July 2005). isbn:
9781560256762.
[27] James Heather and David Lundin. 2008. The append-only web bulletin board.
In International Workshop on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. Springer,
242–256.
[28] Nathan Hernandez. 2021. Nathanph/election-contracts. GitHub. https://github.
com/nathanph/election-contracts.
[29] David Jefferson, Avi Rubin, and Barbara Simons. 2007. A comment on the




[30] David Jefferson, Aviel D Rubin, Barbara Simons, and David Wagner. 2004. A
Security Analysis of the Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment
(SERVE). Technical report.
[31] Chunheng Jiang, Sujoy Sikdar, Jun Wang, Lirong Xia, and Zhibing Zhao. 2017.
Practical algorithms for computing stv and other multi-round voting rules. In
EXPLORE-2017: The 4th Workshop on Exploring Beyond the Worst Case in
Computational Social Choice.
[32] Aniket Kate and Ian Goldberg. 2009. Distributed key generation for the in-
ternet. In 2009 29th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing
Systems. IEEE, 119–128.
[33] Aggelos Kiayias and Moti Yung. 2004. The vector-ballot e-voting approach. In
International Conference on Financial Cryptography. Springer, 72–89.
[34] Gregory Miller. 2010. The d.c. pilot project: facts vs. fictions from our view-
point. TrustTheVote. (July 6, 2010). https://trustthevote.org/blog/2010/07/
06/dc-pilot-project-facts-vs-fictions-osdv-viewpoint/.
[35] Satoshi Nakamoto. 2009. Bitcoin: a peer-to-peer electronic cash system. (2009).
http://www.bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
143
[36] Mike Ossipoff and Warren Smith. 2021. RangeVoting.org - survey of FBC
(favorite-betrayal criterion). https://rangevoting.org/FBCsurvey.html.
[37] 2021. RangeVoting.org - criteria obeyed and disobeyed by score voting. https:
//www.rangevoting.org/Criteria.html.
[38] 2021. RangeVoting.org - single winner voting system comparison chart. https:
//www.rangevoting.org/CompChart.html#properties.
[39] Andrew Reynolds. 2005. Electoral system design: The New International IDEA
Handbook. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,
Stockholm, Sweden. isbn: 91-85391-18-2.
[40] Peter YA Ryan and Vanessa Teague. 2009. Pretty good democracy. In Inter-
national Workshop on Security Protocols. Springer, 111–130.
[41] Donald G Saari. 2008. Mathematics and voting. Notices of the AMS, 55, 4,
448–455.
[42] Krishna Sampigethaya and Radha Poovendran. 2006. A survey on mix net-
works and their secure applications. Proceedings of the IEEE, 94, 12, 2142–
2181.
144
[43] Dominik Schiener. 2016. Liquid democracy: true democracy for the 21st cen-
tury. Medium. (March 11, 2016). https://medium.com/organizer- sandbox/
liquid-democracy-true-democracy-for-the-21st-century-7c66f5e53b6f.
[44] Warren D Smith. 2006. Comparative Survey of Multiwinner Election Methods.
Technical report, 16.
[45] Drew Springall, Travis Finkenauer, Zakir Durumeric, Jason Kitcat, Harri Hursti,
Margaret MacAlpine, and J Alex Halderman. 2014. Security analysis of the
estonian internet voting system. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 703–715.
[46] Nicolaus Tideman. 1995. The single transferable vote. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 9, 1, 27–38.
[47] U.S. Congress. 2001. Electronic voting demonstration project. (2001). https:
//uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=115&page=1277.
[48] U.S. Congress. 2010. National defense authorization act for fiscal year 2010.
(2010). https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=123&page=2190.
[49] U.S. Election Assistance Commission. 2011. A Survey of Internet Voting. Tech-
nical report. U.S. Election Assistance Commission, (September 14, 2011), 149.
https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/SIV-FINAL.pdf.
145
[50] Scott Wolchok, Eric Wustrow, Dawn Isabel, and J Alex Halderman. 2012. At-
tacking the washington, dc internet voting system. In International Conference
on Financial Cryptography and Data Security. Springer, 114–128.
[51] Gavin Wood et al. 2014. Ethereum: A Secure Decentralised Generalised Trans-
action Ledger. Technical report 2014, 1–32.
146
Appendix A – Software Documentation
The source code, architecture, design, and documentation thereof of are presented,
reviewed, and provided here. The code reviewed in this section is not guaranteed
to represent the most accurate or recent state of the software and is abbreviated
throughout for readability. The most recent state of the software can be found on
GitHub. [28] This appendix is divided into three major sections:
• Authorization Components, which introduces the design and implementation
of authorization-related components.
• Election Components, which introduces the design and implementation of election-
related components.




The authorization components are those which are responsible for managing
access control for contracts. This section builds varying complexities of access control
beginning with:
1. Primitive Contract Ownership, which reviews basic access control mechanisms;
then
2. Generalized Access Control, which introduces components for guarding access
to resources; next
3. Access Control Lists, which demonstrate components for constructing and man-
aging access control lists and integrating them with the components introduced
for generalized access control; and finally,
4. Registries, which demonstrates voter registry components leveraging the afore-









hasPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
getPermissions(address, bytes4) : uint256
grantPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
removePermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool




















isAuthorized(address, bytes4) : bool
BasicACL








requiredPermissions : mapping(bytes4 => uint8)
setACL(BasicACL) : bool
addResourcePermission(bytes4, uint8) : bool
hasPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
getPermissions(address, bytes4) : uint256
grantPermissions(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool










canCall(address, bytes4) : bool
<<interface>>
Authority





isAuthorized(address, bytes4) : bool
Figure A.1: Authorization dependency graph modeling.
A.1.1 Primitive Contract Ownership
Managing contract ownership is one of the most basic forms of access control
in the Ethereum ecosystem. Here we introduce:
1. interface Ownership , which defines functions to express contract ownership,
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2. contract RestrictTo , which defines a modifier for restricting access to function
calls based on an address, and
3. contract Owned , a convenience contract, which provides an implementation of



















Figure A.2: Contract ownership dependency graph modeling.
A.1.1.1 Contract RestrictTo
The contract, contract RestrictTo , introduces a single modifier, modifier restrictTo ,
which requires the caller of the function, msg.sender , to have the same address as the
argument, address _subject , provided to the modifier when called.
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 contract RestrictTo Listing A.1
1 contract RestrictTo {
2 modifier restrictTo (address _subject) {





 modifier restrictTo (address _subject) , restricts access to function calls based on
an address provided.
Restriction to functions is accomplished by comparing the address of the
function caller, msg.sender , against the configured address, address _subject .
If the address of the msg.sender does not match the address of the _subject
then the require statement will force the immediately arrest of contract
evaluation, revert the state of the contract, refund any remaining gas,
gasleft(), to the caller, and exit.1
 address _subject , the subject who is to be granted access to the function.
The address of the subject may be any Ethereum account, including
contract accounts.
Interface Ownership The interface, interface Ownership , introduces two functions
for managing contract ownership:
1Note that the caller, msg.sender , of the function will not necessarily be an external account,
e.g., human user; the caller of the contract function may itself also be a contract, i.e., a contract
account, which is calling the contract function from its own contract function.
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1. function getOwner , which is expected to return the address of the owner of the
contract, and
2. function setOwner , which is expected to update the address of the owner of the
contract.
 interface Ownership Listing A.2
1 interface Ownership {
2 function getOwner () public view returns (address _owner);
3 function setOwner (address _owner) public returns (bool _success);
4 }
 Interface Specification
 function getOwner () , returns the address of the owner of the contract.
 address _owner , the subject representing the owner of the contract.
 function setOwner (address _owner) , updates the address representing the owner
of the contract.
 address _owner , the subject which is to be granted ownership of the contract.2
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful; otherwise false.
A.1.1.2 Contract Owned
A convenience contract, contract Owned , implements interface Ownership and
extends contract RestrictTo ; in doing so, contract Owned provides a simple mechanism
2 The address of the subject may be any Ethereum account, including contract accounts.
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for expressing contract ownership, extending contract Owned ; e.g., contract MyContract is Owned {} .
 contract Owned Listing A.3
1 contract Owned is RestrictTo, Ownership {
2 address public owner;
3
4 constructor () {
5 owner = msg.sender;
6 }
7




12 function setOwner (address _owner) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool
_success) {ãÑ





 address owner , maintains the address of the current owner of the contract.
 Contract Operations
 constructor () , upon creation and initialization of this contract the constructor
sets the address owner property of the contract to the address of the contract
creator, msg.sender , i.e., the subject submitting the CREATE opcode.
 function getOwner () , returns the address of the owner of the contract.
 address _owner , the subject representing the owner of the contract.
 function setOwner (address _owner) , updates the address representing the owner
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of the contract, effectively transferring ownership of the contract.
 modifier restrictTo (owner) , restricts access to the function such that only the
current owner of the contract can update/transfer ownership of the contract.
 address _owner , the subject who is to be granted access to the function.
 bool _success , the subject representing the owner of the contract
A.1.2 Generalizing Contract Access Control
In order to generalize contract access control we introduce:
1. interface Authority , which defines functions to determine whether some subject
is permitted to access some resource,
2. contract Authorization , which defines a modifier for restricting access to function
calls based on an address, and
3. contract Guard , a convenience contract, which provides an implementation of
interface Authorization by aggregating implementations of interface Authority .
Together these components allow us to provide a generalized access control
























isAuthorized(address, bytes4) : bool
<<interface>>
Authority
+ canCall(address, bytes4) : bool
Figure A.3: Generalized contract access control.
A.1.2.1 Interface Authority
The interface, interface Authority , introduces functionality for managing whether
some subject, typically an Ethereum account represented by address, can access some
resource, typically an Ethereum function represented by function signature, bytes4. By
defining the resource by it’s function signature and not by a specific function owned by
a specific contract we leave open the possibility for managing contract access control
across contracts, a functionality which will be necessary to build pseudo-centralized
155
registration authorities.
 interface Authority Listing A.4
1 interface Authority {




 function canCall (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) , evaluates whether some re-
source, contract function, can be used by some subject, Ethereum account.
 address _subject , the subject, Ethereum account, whose permissions are be-
ing evaluated.3
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, contract function, which the subject’s permis-
sions are being evaluated against.
 bool _canCall , resolves to true if the subject, address _subject , is permitted
to access the resource, bytes4 _resource , otherwise false.
A.1.2.2 Interface Authorization
The interface, interface Authorization , introduces functionality for managing
authorities, function getAuthority() and function setAuthority() , and also functional-
ity similar to that of an Authority, function isAuthorized() .
3The address of the subject may be any Ethereum account, including contract accounts.
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 interface Authorization Listing A.5
1 interface Authorization {
2 function getAuthority () public constant returns (address _authority);
3 function setAuthority (address _authority) public returns (bool _success);




 function getAuthority () , returns the address of a contract which implements the
interface Authority.
 address _authority , the address of a contract which implments the interface
Authority.
 function setAuthority (address _authority) , updates the state of the contract to
to reflect the new contract which provides an implementation of the Authority
interface.
 address _authority , the address of a contract which implements the interface
Authority.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful; otherwise false.
 function isAuthorized (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) , evaluates whether some
subject, Ethereum account, is authorized to access some resource, contract function.
 address _subject , the subject, Ethereum account, whose permissions are be-
ing evaluated.4
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, contract function, which the subject’s permis-
sions are being evaluated against.
4The address of the subject may be any Ethereum account, including contract accounts.
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 bool _isAuthorized , resolves to true if the subject, address _subject , is per-
mitted to access the resource, bytes4 _resource , otherwise false.
A.1.2.3 Contract Guarded
The contract, contract Guarded , is a contract which offers a convenient mech-
anism for easily integrating generalized contract access control functionality; e.g.,
contract MyContract is Guarded {} . contract Guarded, by virtue of implementing the
Authorization interface, supports deferring access control responsibilities to an exter-
nal contract which implements the Authority interface while leaving open the possi-
bility for a contract to provide its own access control implementation by itself imple-
menting the Authority interface.
 contract Guarded Listing A.6
1 contract Guarded is Owned, Authorization {
2 Authority public authority;
3




8 function setAuthority (address _authority) public auth returns (bool
_success) {ãÑ




13 function isAuthorized (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) public returns
(bool _isAuthorized) {ãÑ
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14 if (_subject == address(this)) return true;
15 if (authority == Authority(0)) return false;
16 if (_subject == owner) return true;
17 return authority.canCall(_subject, _resource);
18 }
19











 modifier auth () , restricts access to function calls based on an address provided.
Restriction to functions is accomplished by comparing the address of the
function caller, msg.sender , against the configured address, address _subject .
If the address of the msg.sender does not match the address of the _subject
then the require statement will force the immediately arrest of contract
evaluation, revert the state of the contract, refund any remaining gas,
gasleft(), to the caller, and exit.5
 address _subject , the subject who is to be granted access to the function.
The address of the subject may be any Ethereum account, including
contract accounts.
 modifier authorized (address _resource) , restricts access to function calls based
5Note that the caller, msg.sender , of the function will not necessarily be an external account,
e.g., human user; the caller of the contract function may itself also be a contract, i.e., a contract
account, which is calling the contract function from its own contract function.
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on an address provided.
Restriction to functions is accomplished by comparing the address of the
function caller, msg.sender , against the configured address, address _subject .
If the address of the msg.sender does not match the address of the _subject
then the require statement will force the immediately arrest of contract
evaluation, revert the state of the contract, refund any remaining gas,
gasleft(), to the caller, and exit.6
 address _subject , the subject who is to be granted access to the function.
The address of the subject may be any Ethereum account, including
contract accounts.
A.1.3 Access Control Lists
We introduce access control lists to provide a generalized form of access control
through a well-understood and common interface:
1. interface AccessControlList , which defines the basic actions required for an ac-
cess control list implementation;
2. contract BasicACL , which provides a basic implementation of interface AccessControlList ;
and
6Note that the caller, msg.sender , of the function will not necessarily be an external account,
e.g., human user; the caller of the contract function may itself also be a contract, i.e., a contract
account, which is calling the contract function from its own contract function.
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3. contract ACLAuthority , which aggregates an interface AccessControlList imple-









hasPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
getPermissions(address, bytes4) : uint256
grantPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
revokePermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool


























requiredPermissions : mapping(bytes4 => uint8)
setACL(AccessControlList) : bool
addResourcePermission(bytes4, uint8) : bool
hasPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
getPermissions(address, bytes4) : uint256
grantPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
revokePermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool




+ canCall(address, bytes4) : bool
Figure A.4: Generalized contract access control by way of access control lists.
161
A.1.3.1 Interface AccessControlList
The interface, interface AccessControlList , introduces five function definitions
to achieve basic access control list functionality:
1. function hasPermission , which validates that a subject has the permission re-
quired access some resource.
2. function getPermissions , which returns the permissions some subject has for a
given resource.
3. function setPermissions , which updates the permissions some subject has for a
given resource.
4. function grantPermission , which grants a single permission for some subject with
respect to some resource.
5. function revokePermission , which revokes a single permission for some subject
with respect to some resource.
 interface AccessControlList Listing A.7
1 interface AccessControlList {
2 function hasPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission)ãÑ
3 public view returns (bool _hasPermission);
4
5 function getPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource)
6 public view returns (uint256 _permissions);
7
8 function setPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint256
_permissions)ãÑ
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9 public returns (bool _success);
10
11 function grantPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission)ãÑ
12 public returns (bool _success);
13
14 function revokePermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission)ãÑ
15 public returns (bool _success);
16 }
 Interface Specification
 function hasPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) , eval-
uates whether some subject has the requisite permission to access some resource.
 address _subject , the address of an account representing the subject, i.e., the
user, to evaluate permissions against.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, signature hash of a Solidity function, to vali-
date permissions against.
 uint8 _permission , a permission level, or action, which is being validated.
 bool _hasPermission , returns the true if the subject has the requisite permis-
sion to access the resource, otherwise false.
 function getPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) , retrieves the permis-
sions, for a <subject, resource> pair.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are to
be retrieved.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions
should be retrieved for.
 uint256 _permissions , the uint256 representation of the subject’s permissions
for a given resource.
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 function setPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint256 _permissions) ,
updates a subject’s permissions for some resource.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are to
be modified.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions are
to be modified for.
 uint256 _permissions , the uint256 representation of the subject’s new permis-
sions for the resource.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise false.
 function grantPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) , grants
a subject some permission for a given resource.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are to
be modified.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions are
to be modified for.
 uint8 _permission , a uint8 value representing the permission-bit to enable for
the <subject, resource> pair.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise false.
 function revokePermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) ,
revokes a subject’s permission for a given resource.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are to
be modified.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions are
to be modified for.
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 uint8 _permission , a uint8 value representing the permission-bit to revoke for
the <subject, resource> pair.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise false.
A.1.3.2 Contract BasicACL
The contract, contract BasicACL , implements the ACL interface, interface AccessControlList ,
to provide a primitive ACL implementation. The contract implementation is backed
by a mapping of references, from subject to resource to permissions — as described
in Chapter 4, Methods — i.e., a nested sparse vector mapping.
 contract BasicACL Listing A.8
1 contract BasicACL is Owned, AccessControlList {
2 mapping (address => mapping (bytes4 => uint256)) subjectResourcePermissions;
3
4 function hasPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8




5 uint256 result = subjectResourcePermissions[_subject][_resource] &
(uint256(1) << _permission);ãÑ
6 return (result > 0);
7 }
8
9 function getPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) public constant




13 function grantPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool _success) {ãÑ






18 function revokePermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool _success) {ãÑ





23 function setPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, _permissions)
public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool _success) {ãÑ





 mapping (address => mapping (bytes4 => uint256)) subjectResourcePermissions a nest-
ing mapping used to record the permissions which subjects have to access var-
ious resources.
Here subjects are represented and identified by their account address;
resources are assumed to be function signatures, bytes4; and permis-
sions are bit vectors, backed by uint256 values, where bit masks are
leveraged to retrieve individual permission values.
 Contract Operations
 function hasPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) , eval-
uates whether some subject has the requisite permission to access some resource.
Permission evaluation occurs by:
1. retrieving the permissions bit vector from the mapping subjectResourcePermissions ,
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where the subject, address _subject , and resource, bytes4 _resource ,
are used as keys;
2. creating a permission bit mask by left-shifting 1 _permission times,
1 << _permission ;
3. evaluating permissions ^ bit_mask ; and finally,
4. returning true if the value resulting from the evaluation is greater
than 0, i.e., the subject has permission to access to the resource.
 address _subject , the address of an account representing the subject, i.e., the
user, to evaluate permissions against.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, signature hash of a Solidity function, to vali-
date permissions against.
 uint8 _permission , a permission level, or action, which is being validated.
 bool _hasPermission , returns the true if the subject has the requisite permis-
sion to access the resource, otherwise false.
 function getPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) , retrieves the per-
missions, for a <subject, resource> pair.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are
to be retrieved.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions
should be retrieved for.
 uint256 _permissions , the uint256 representation of the subject’s permissions
for a given resource.
 function setPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint256 _permissions) ,
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updates a subject’s permissions for some resource.
 modifier restrictTo (owner) , restricts access to the function such that only
the current owner of the contract can call it.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are
to be modified.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions are
to be modified for.
 uint256 _permissions , the uint256 representation of the subject’s new permis-
sions for the resource.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise
false.
 function grantPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) ,
grants a subject permission for a given resource.
Permission grant occurs by:
1. retrieving the permissions bit vector from the mapping subjectResourcePermissions ,
where the subject, address _subject , and resource, bytes4 _resource ,
are used as keys;
2. creating a permission bit mask by left-shifting 1 _permission times,
1 << _permission ;
3. evaluating permissions _ bit_mask to produce a new permissions
bit vector; and finally,
4. updating the state of the contract by storing the resulting permis-
sions bit vector back into the subjectResourcePermissions mapping.
 modifier restrictTo (owner) , restricts access to the function such that only
the current owner of the contract can call it.
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 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are
to be modified.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions are
to be modified for.
 uint8 _permission , a uint8 value representing the permission-bit to enable for
the <subject, resource> pair.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise
false.
 function revokePermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) ,
revokes a subject’s permission for a given resource.
Permission revocation occurs by:
1. retrieving the permissions bit vector from the mapping subjectResourcePermissions ,
where the subject, address _subject , and resource, bytes4 _resource ,
are used as keys;
2. creating a permission bit mask by left-shifting 1 _permission times,
1 << _permission ;
3. flipping all of the bits of the permission bit mask, ~bit_mask ;
4. evaluating permissions ^ bit_mask to produce a new permissions
bit vector; and finally,
5. updating the state of the contract by storing the resulting permis-
sions bit vector back into the subjectResourcePermissions mapping.
 modifier restrictTo (owner) , restricts access to the function such that only
the current owner of the contract can call it.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject whose permissions are
to be modified.
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 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permissions are
to be modified for.
 uint8 _permission , a uint8 value representing the permission-bit to revoke for
the <subject, resource> pair.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise
false.
A.1.3.3 Contract ACLAuthority
The contract, contract ACLAuthority , merges the ACL functionality introduced
by interface AccessControlList with the generalized access control functionality in-
troduced by interface Authority .
 contract ACLAuthority Listing A.9
1 contract ACLAuthority is Owned, Authority, AccessControlList {
2 AccessControlList acl;
3 mapping (bytes4 => uint8) requiredResourcePermission;
4
5 constructor (bool _createACL) {
6 if (_createACL) acl = new BasicACL();
7 }
8
9 function hasPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission) public constant returns (bool _hasPermission) {ãÑ
10 return acl.hasPermission(_subject, _resource, _permission);
11 }
12
13 function getPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) public constant
returns (uint256 _permissions) {ãÑ




17 function grantPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool _success) {ãÑ
18 return acl.grantPermission(_subject, _resource, _permission);
19 }
20
21 function revokePermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8
_permission) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool _success) {ãÑ
22 return acl.removePermission(_subject, _resource, _permission);
23 }
24
25 function setPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint256
_permissions) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool _success) {ãÑ
26 return acl.setPermissions(_subject, _resource, _permissions);
27 }
28
29 function setACL(AccessControlList _acl) public restrictTo(owner) returns
(bool _success) {ãÑ
30 assert(_acl.owner() == address(this));




35 function setRequiredResourcePermission (bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission)
public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool _success) {ãÑ




40 function canCall (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) public constant returns
(bool _canCall) {ãÑ





 AccessControlList acl maintains the address of an ACL implementation, a contract
which implements interface AccessControlList .
 mapping (bytes4 => uint8) requiredResourcePermissions maintains a mapping of
functions, bytes4 , to required permission, uint8 .
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 Contract Operations
 constructor (bool _createACL) , upon creation and initialization of this contract
the constructor can deploy a contract, contract BasicACL , if the bool, bool _createACL ,
is set to true.
 bool _createACL , set to true to deploy an ACL implementation, contract BasicACL ,
in addition to this contract; otherwise false.
 function setAcl (AccessControlList _acl) , updates the contract reference which
is responsible for managing ACL requests.
 modifier restrictTo (owner) , restricts access to the function such that only
the current owner of the contract can call it.
 AccessControlList _acl , the ACL implementation which access control re-
sponsibilities are to be delegated to.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise
false.
 function setRequiredResourcePermission (bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) , up-
dates the mapping representing the permission required to access some resource,
function signature.
 modifier restrictTo (owner) , restricts access to the function such that only
the current owner of the contract can call it.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, function signature, which the permission is
to be modified for.
 uint8 _permission , a uint8 value representing the permission-bit required for
the resource.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise
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false.
 function canCall (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) , evaluates whether a sub-
ject can access to some resource by validating with the ACL implementation
that the subject has the required resource permission.
 address _subject , the subject, Ethereum account, whose permissions are be-
ing evaluated.
 bytes4 _resource , the resource, contract function, which the subject’s permis-
sions are being evaluated against.
 bool _canCall , resolves to true if the subject, address _subject , is permitted
to access the resource, bytes4 _resource , otherwise false.
 function hasPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) ,
function getPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) ,
function setPermissions (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint256 _permissions) ,
function grantPermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) ,
function revokePermission (address _subject, bytes4 _resource, uint8 _permission) ,
all ACL responsibilities originating from interface AccessControlList are dele-
gated to the provided ACL implementation stored in AccessControlList acl .
 modifier restrictTo (owner) , restricts access to the function such that only the
current owner of the contract can call this function; this applies to functions
setPermissions , grantPermission , and revokePermission .
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A.1.4 Registries
Having completed the work of generalizing access control and building access
control lists, we now introduce a simplified access control model for managing voter
registration during elections.
1. interface Registry , which defines the functions for registering voters for an
election, and
2. contract VoterRegistrationAuthority , which implements and aggregates several
interfaces and interface implementations — namely interface Registry , interface Authority ,





































requiredPermissions : mapping(bytes4 => uint8)
setACL(AccessControlList) : bool
addResourcePermission(bytes4, uint8) : bool
hasPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
getPermissions(address, bytes4) : uint256
grantPermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool
revokePermission(address, bytes4, uint8) : bool




+ canCall(address, bytes4) : bool
Figure A.5: Simplified election registry.
A.1.4.1 Interface Registry
The interface, interface Registry , introduces three function definitions re-
quired to achieve basic registry functionality:
1. function register , which registers a subject.
2. function unregister , which unregisters a subject.
3. function isRegistered , which evaluates whether a subject is registered.
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 interface Registry Listing A.10
1 interface Registry {
2 function register (address _subject) public returns (bool _success);
3 function unregister (address _subject) public returns (bool _success);




 function isRegistered (address _subject) , evaluates whether some subject is reg-
istered.
 address _subject , the address of an account representing the subject, to eval-
uate the registration of.
 bool _isRegistered , returns the true if the subject is registered, otherwise
false.
 function unregister (address _subject) , unregisters a subject.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject who is to be unregistered.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise false.
 function register (address _subject) , registers a subject.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject who is to be registered.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise false.
176
A.1.4.2 Contract VoterRegistrationAuthority
The contract, contract VoterRegistrationAuthority , is the final component of
our authorization design and is required to construct a generalized voter registration
authority capable of managing registered voters and conducting elections.
 contract VoterRegistrationAuthority Listing A.11
1 contract VoterRegistrationAuthority is Owned, Registry, Authority {





7 mapping (bytes32 => bytes4) resourceSignatures;
8
9 constructor () public {
10 acl = new ACLAuthority(true);
11








20 function register (address _voter) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool
_success) {ãÑ




24 function unregister (address _voter) public restrictTo(owner) returns (bool
_success) {ãÑ




28 function isRegistered (address _voter) public constant returns (bool
_isRegistered) {ãÑ
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32 function canCall (address _subject, bytes4 _resource) public constant returns
(bool _canCall) {ãÑ




 AccessControlList acl maintains the address of an ACL implementation, a contract
which implements interface AccessControlList .
 mapping (bytes32 => bytes4) resourceSignatures maintains a mapping of strings,
bytes32 , to function signature, bytes4 .
 Contract Operations
 constructor () , upon creation and initialization of this contract the constructor
will deploy a contract, contract BasicACL .
 function isRegistered (address _subject) , evaluates whether some subject is reg-
istered.
 address _subject , the address of an account representing the subject, to eval-
uate the registration of.
 bool _isRegistered , returns the true if the subject is registered, otherwise
false.
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 function unregister (address _subject) , unregisters a subject.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject who is to be unregistered.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise
false.
 function register (address _subject) , registers a subject.
 address _subject , the account address of the subject who is to be registered.
 bool _success , resolves to true if the operation was successful, otherwise
false.
A.2 Election Components
This section explores the components relating to elections.
A.2.1 Election Contracts
 contract FirstPastThePost Listing A.12
1 contract FirstPastThePost is Owned, Guard {
2 uint public creationTime = now;
3
4 Choice[] public choices;
5 mapping(address => bool) public voted;
6 Choice public winner;
7
8 enum Phase { Configuration, Frozen, Vote, Tally }
9








17 mapping (Phase => PhaseProperties) phases;
18 Phase public phase = Phase.Configuration;
19
20 constructor () {








29 // This is the current phase.
30 uint public freezeTime;
31
32 // Start and end time for the election.
33 uint public voteStartTime;
34 uint public voteEndTime;
35
36 // This is a type for a single proposal.
37 struct Choice {
38 // Short name (up to 32 bytes).
39 bytes32 name;
40
41 // TODO: choice description?
42 // bytes32 description;
43




48 // Restrict calls to _account.
49 modifier restrictTo(address _account) {




54 // Check current stage.
55 modifier atPhase(Phase _phase) {




60 // This modifier goes to the next phase after the function is done.
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66 // Move into next phase.
67 function nextPhase() internal {
68 phase = Phase(uint(phase) + 1);
69 }
70
71 // Perform timed transitions. Be sure to mention this modifier first,
72 // otherwise the guards will not take the new stage into account.
73 modifier timedTransitions() {
74 if (phase == Phase.Frozen && now >= voteStartTime)
75 nextPhase();
76 if (phase == Phase.Vote && now >= voteEndTime)
77 nextPhase();




82 /* Election Functions */
83 // Freeze the configuration.
84 function freeze() restrictTo(owner) atPhase(Phase.Configuration)
transitionNextPhase {ãÑ
85 require(voteStartTime > now);
86 require(choices.length > 1);




91 // Cast a ballot.
92 function vote(uint8 choice) timedTransitions atPhase(Phase.Vote) {
93 // Each address can only vote once.
94 require(!voted[msg.sender]);
95 voted[msg.sender] = true;
96
97 choices[choice].voteCount += 1;
98 }
99
100 // Tally ballots.
101 function tally() timedTransitions atPhase(Phase.Tally) {
102 winner = choices[0];
103 for (uint8 i = 0; i < choices.length; i++) {
104 if (choices[i].voteCount > winner.voteCount)





109 /* Configuration Functions */
110 constructor () {}
111
112 function setVoteStartTime(uint _voteStartTime) atPhase(Phase.Configuration)
restrictTo(owner) {ãÑ
113 voteStartTime = _voteStartTime;
114 }
115
116 function setVoteEndTime(uint _voteEndTime) atPhase(Phase.Configuration)
restrictTo(owner) {ãÑ
117 voteEndTime = _voteEndTime;
118 }
119
120 function addChoices(bytes32[] _choices) atPhase(Phase.Configuration)
restrictTo(owner) {ãÑ

















This section explores the components relating to vote delegation. The dele-




 Vote Delegation Listing A.13
1 mapping (address => Voter) voters;
2
3 function delegateVote (address delegate) public auth returns (bool _success) {
4 // The `auth` modifier prevents this function from being
5 // called until the Authority has confirmed that the
6 // the message sender has the proper privileges.
7 Voter cursor;
8 uint40 weight = voters[msg.sender].weight;
9
10 // Cycle Detection
11 mapping (address => bool) visited;
12 visited[msg.sender] = true;
13 visited[delegate] = true;
14
15 cursor = voters[delegate];
16 while (cursor.delegate) {
17 address newDelegate = cursor.delegate;
18 if (visited[newDelegate]) return false;
19 cursor = voters[newDelegate];
20 visited[newDelegate] = true;
21 }
22
23 // Decrement weights of old delegate chain.
24 cursor = voters[msg.sender];
25 while (cursor.delegate) {
26 address newDelegate = cursor.delegate;
27 cursor = voters[newDelegate];
28 cursor.weight -= weight;
29 }
30
31 // Increment weights of new delegate chain.
32 cursor = voters[msg.sender];
33 cursor.delegate = delegate;
34 while (cursor.delegate) {
35 address newDelegate = cursor.delegate;
36 cursor = voters[newDelegate];
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